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Abstract 
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the annual and of the long-term 
performance of personal pension funds relative to their Primary Prospectus 
Benchmarks (PPBs) and T-bills.  The study covers 9,659 personal pension funds from 
across all 30 ABI investment sectors that operated in the UK in the 1980-2009 period. 
Of these, 4,531 pension funds are compared against their PPBs. The performance 
measured by ordinary excess returns over the UK T-bills and over PPBs, as well as the 
Sharpe ratio, Sharpe ratio adjusted for skewness and kurtosis, Sortino ratio in relation 
to the UK T-bills and PPBs, and the Modigliani-Modigliani measure (M2) are calculated 
for arithmetic, geometric and log returns. We find convincing evidence that pension 
funds lack challenging long-term performance targets. We argue that the existing PPBs 
are easy to outperform given that funds are allowed to diversify in assets not included 
in their PPBs. We discuss policy implications of our findings.      
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“Wealth Manager 1: Last year was easy for us wealth managers... 
Wealth Manager 2: Yes. Equities looked risky so we put our clients’ money on deposit in the bank 
meaning we got paid fees for doing nothing ….. but since then stock markets have powered ahead 
and interest rates on bank accounts have dwindled to almost zero, ….. so this year we’re back to 
actively investing our clients’ funds. One’s got to bear in mind that cash in the bank now earns so 
little that once you factor in inflation the returns on it are negative… 
Wealth Manager 1: Indeed, which makes it a handy benchmark to compare our investment performance 
against; One we can easily be seen to beat…” 
Transcript from Alex Cartoon 
The Daily Telegraph, Business Section, May 1, 2013 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The above transcript is taken from a daily U.K. cartoon, Alex, which bases its 
humour on portraying the selfish and cynical attitudes of fund managers in the City of 
London. The cartoon depicts the important issues faced by investors depositing their 
savings with wealth management companies, i.e., how is performance measured, are 
performance targets appropriately set, are savings really performing?   
 These questions are particularly important for pension investments. This is, in part, 
because the reforms undertaken by numerous governments to induce personal 
responsibility of individuals for old-age provision, combined with the steady move of 
the pension industry towards an asset-backed structure and a defined contribution 
nature of pension investments, make ordinary investors vulnerable to low income at 
retirement.  The vulnerability is further magnified by the fact that many pension 
contributors cannot be expected to have the basic financial knowledge necessary to 
actively monitor the performance of their pension investments (van Rooij et al. 2011). 
Additional difficulty is also embedded in the long-term nature of pension savings. As 
long-term commitment to saving can be difficult (Phelps and Pollak 1968), so can 
commitment to long-term monitoring.   
In the light of this, setting benchmarks that are challenging for fund managers and 
informative for contributors is important. The importance of choosing the right 
benchmark for comparative purposes has been well recognised in the finance literature 
(e.g., Jensen et al. 1972; Modigliani and Pogue 1974; Blume and Friend 1975; Roll 
1977; Roll and Ross 1994; Ferson et al. 1999; Kryzanowski and Rahman, 2008). 
However, suitability of existing benchmarks has not received much attention even 
though it is well recognised that the choice of investment strategies and their consequent 
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success may heavily depend on targets set for asset managers. When there is no 
information about portfolio holdings of individual pension funds and performance 
targets imposed on managers, studying the performance of benchmarks and funds in 
relation to these benchmarks can provide a valuable lesson. It can inform on whether 
pension funds’ investments are long-term orientated (as regulators, policymakers and 
contributors would wish for), or whether they are focused on delivering good short-
term performance (as a manager’s career concern argument would suggest).   
To the best of our knowledge, this paper, using data from the UK personal pension 
industry, is the first one to discuss whether benchmarks used by personal pension funds 
are appropriate and informative for contributors, and how personal pension funds 
perform in relation to these benchmarks. It is also the first to provide an assessment of 
a wide range of personal pension funds’ investment styles.  
The UK personal pension funds form one of the biggest and oldest personal pension 
industries in the world with over £300bn of AUM (IMA, 2012).3 Understanding of the 
fund-benchmark performance relationship of the UK personal pension funds can have 
far reaching implications for the development and performance of the personal pension 
industry in the UK and overseas. Given that investments of the British pension funds 
are subject to prudential rules, i.e., they are not constrained by tight investment 
restrictions (like, for example, those in many emerging markets), fund performance can 
be attributed to asset management practices rather than overzealous regulations. 
Therefore, studying the performance of the British personal pension funds helps 
understand the role of benchmarks as performance incentives. Understanding of such 
incentives is important given the fast pace of adoption of defined contribution pension 
schemes around the world, and the increasing reliance on benchmarks as the incentive 
and monitoring mechanisms.4  
In total, we analyse 9,659 personal pension funds across 30 different investment 
styles (classification according to the Association of British Insurers, ABI) over the 
                                               
3 In the UK, occupational pension provision has a longer history than state pension. Individual cases of 
an early form of occupational pensions have been recorded in the 13th and 14th centuries, although the 
first funded occupational pension was set up in 1743 to provide for widows of the Church of Scotland 
ministers. Personal pension plans were set up by the 1986 Social Security Act and became available from 
July 1988. In 2001 the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 introduced stakeholder pension schemes.  
4 For a discussion of the importance of using the right benchmark see Lakonishok et al. (1992), Shukla 
and Trzcinka (1994), Blake et al. (1999), Dor et al. (2003), Chan et al. (2009), Ferruz et al. (2010). 
Prospectus benchmarks have also been used by Sensoy (2009) in a study of mutual fund performance.  
Non-benchmark evaluations have also been proposed to mitigate problems with inappropriate 
benchmarking (e.g., Grinblatt and Titman 1993). 
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1980-2009 period. For 4,531 of these funds we identified their Primary Prospectus 
Benchmarks (PPBs), i.e., benchmarks chosen by funds for advertisement purposes, in 
communication with existing contributors and to assess pension fund managers’ 
performance. This allows for comparison of fund and benchmark performance for a 
significant fraction of personal pension funds offered to UK investors.  
There is only a handful of studies devoted to the performance of pension funds per 
se.5 The vast majority of the literature on fund performance is focused on mutual funds.6 
In particular, the US mutual fund industry is studied in great detail, which is  
understandable given the size of the US mutual fund industry ($13 trillion AUM in 
2012; ICI 2013) and the fact that 94% of 52.3 million American households investing 
in mutual funds treat these savings as retirement financing (ICI, 2011). Outside the US, 
mutual funds are not so important in servicing the pension market.7 Yet, there are very 
few studies that address the pension industry issues, and even fewer that recognise that 
methods used to investigate performance of mutual funds are not necessarily apt to 
assess the performance of pension funds.   
This is surprising because the nature of investments of mutual and pension 
industries should be very different with pension funds being much more long-term 
orientated than mutual funds. Consequently, given that short-term and long-term 
optimal portfolios may be very different (Cochrane 2014), and short-term performance 
of long-term optimal portfolios may be quite unflattering, even if the long-term 
performance is good (Campbell and Viceira 2002), the assessment of pension funds’ 
performance using the same techniques that are used for mutual funds may give a biased 
and unfair picture. Pension fund performance should be assessed on a long-term basis.  
Assessing long-term performance is also important because pension funds’ 
contributors cannot pocket short-term benefits from funds and move on to another fund 
                                               
5 E.g., Ippolito and Turner (1987), Lakonishok et al. (1992), Coggin et al. (1993), Browm et al. (1997), 
Ambachtsheer et al. (1998), Blake et al. (1999, 2002), Thomas and Tonks (2001), Blake (2003), Bailey 
et al. (2005), Chu and McKenzie (2008), Novy-Marx and Bauh (2011). 
6 E.g., investment skills of fund managers are studied by Henriksson (1984), Coggin et al. (1993), 
Daniel et al. (1997), Bollen and Busse (2005), Cohen et al. (2005), Cuthbertson et al. (2008), Fama and 
French (2010); tests for potential departures from the EMH are investigated by Brown and Goetzmann 
(1995), Elton et al. (1996, 2001, 2011), Carhart (1997), Blake and Timmermann (1998), Davis J.L. 
(2001), Bollen and Busse (2005), Cuthbertson et al. (2008), Ferruz et al. (2009), Huij and Verbeek 
(2009); practices of wooing investors are studied by Cooper et al. (2005), Massa (2003), Agudo and 
Lázoro (2005), Sensoy (2009), Aydogdu and Wellman (2011).  
7 For instance, in 2010 the UK funded pensions accounted for $1.9 trillion of AUM, i.e., they were 
twice as big as mutual funds which by the end of 2010 had only $0.85 trillion of AUM (ICI 2012).  
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or out of pension funds. As discussed in the next section pre-retirement withdrawals are 
discouraged and switching across providers of pension funds can be costly.  
To measure long-term performance we use compounded returns calculated over the 
pension funds’ operation life. In addition we calculate annual returns.  Using 
(annualised) compounded and annual returns we calculate several ‘traditional’ 
measures of performance used by pension funds in communication with contributors, 
i.e., excess returns in relation to UK T-bills and to assigned PPBs, and Sharpe ratio 
(Roy 1952; Sharpe 1966), as well as the Modigliani-Modigliani (M2) measure 
(Modigliani and Modigliani, 1997) to account for risk of the PPBs, Sharpe ratios 
adjusted for skewness and kurtosis (Peizer and White 2006) to account for non-normal 
distributional properties of returns, and the Sortino ratio (Sortino and van der Meer 
1991) to account for downside risk.8  We focus on these measures because (i) we wish 
to analyse compounded as well as average returns, (ii) we need measures that will be 
suitable and comparable across different asset classes and, finally, (iii) we wish to 
assess performance of both the funds and the PPBs. 
Our findings indicate that PPBs are not challenging nor particularly informative 
benchmarks. We find robust evidence that the pension funds of all investment styles 
outperform their PPBs both in the long- and short-run but we argue that this superior 
performance results from expanding pension portfolios to include assets not included 
in their PPBs.  Our results also suggest that pension funds tie themselves to their PPBs’ 
risk profile which means that (i) they may earn lower returns than they could given 
asset classes they invest in, and (ii) they are not so good at outperforming T-bills in 
nominal and risk adjusted terms on an annual basis.  
These results have important implications for future research, pension contributors 
and policy design. In addition to providing the first rigorous assessment of the 
performance of the personal pension industry in the UK, the research directs our 
attention to the complexity of the assessment of performance and the importance of the 
choice of performance benchmarks. The research documents the potentially misleading 
role of the existing benchmarking practices for achieving good long-term performance. 
It seems that the existing benchmarks are far from being optimal long-term performance 
targets, and, in addition, are easy to beat even on an annual basis. This raises the 
question whether there should be greater scrutiny of the process of opening new pension 
                                               
8 Owadally (2014) documents that pension losses follow nonlinear dynamic processes.  
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funds and monitoring their subsequent performance. The results also highlight the 
cyclical nature of investment styles and benefits of international diversification.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a discussion of 
three distinct features of the pension industry that create a base for our research 
questions and empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the dataset. Section 4 defines 
variables used in Section 5, which presents the results of the regression analysis. Section 
6 discusses the finding and Section 7 concludes and outlines a few directions for future 
research.  
 
 
2. Features of personal pensions and research questions 
 
We start from outlining three critical background features of the UK personal 
pension fund industry that are central to our analysis and then identify the primary 
consequent questions that form the core of the investigation.  
The first relates to the relevant time frame for assessment. As discussed in the 
previous section it is common to look at and assess the performance of pension funds 
as if they were mutual funds, i.e., the existing studies of the UK pension funds are 
concerned with their ‘average’ performance (e.g., Blake et al. 1999, Thomas and Tonks 
2001). However, there are fundamental differences between the regulation and the 
nature of pension fund savings in comparison with those of mutual funds which raise 
questions as to whether this is the most informative approach for pension funds. 
Withdrawals and switching across providers of mutual fund investments are much more 
flexible than they are in the case of pension savings. In the case of pension fund savings, 
tax benefits heavily discourage any pre-retirement withdrawals. More importantly, 
switching across saving plans (even within the same provider) is known to be costly. 
Blake (2003) estimates that if a personal scheme was terminated after only one year, a 
contributor might lose as much as 90% of his/her contributions. Wood et al. (2012) 
report that the average marginal cost of a straightforward transfer end-to-end is about 
£105 (or about $160) but they also note that “all providers stressed that the figures they 
gave us were the minimum values, for the most straightforward transfers, and only 
represent a small fraction of the providers’ actual transfer costs”. In the assessment of 
the pre-2009 pension funds charging practices Vaze and Roker (2011) claim that 
“typically between 2 and 6 per cent of the value transferred is paid to the pension 
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company and adviser to meet the cost of switching and marketing”. According to The 
Independent “(w)hile legal, the practice employed by UK pension funds has been 
exposed as being among the worst in Europe with Britons frequently paying up to four 
times the amount paid by their neighbours in Holland and Denmark”.9 Vaze and Roker 
(2011) report that in 2009 alone financial advisers that filed returns to the Financial 
Services Authority had earned around £1.6 billion in commission paid from selling 
investment products like pensions. It is hard to say how much of this amount is earned 
as transfer and switching fees but one can suspect that it is quite high. A review 
conducted by the Financial Service Authority (FSA, 2008) revealed strong irregularities 
in practices and advice on pension transfers and switches. In particular, they “assessed 
around a quarter of firms as providing unsuitable advice in a third or more of the cases 
sampled”. They also found that in the 79% of unsuitable cases the switch involved extra 
product costs.    
Given that pension fund contributors face substantial costs of transfers and switches, 
pocketing short-term benefits and moving on to another fund or out of pension funds in 
search for better performance is hampered. So, whilst it makes perfect sense that mutual 
fund performance is measured on an annual, quarterly or monthly basis, it is not at all 
clear that this is appropriate for pension funds. The costly and restrictive nature of 
switching across pension funds suggests that contributors may need to pay more 
attention to total (long-term) returns and not just average (short-term) returns. At the 
time of retirement, it is the total amount of money that matters, not whether, for 
example, pension funds had a good average return for a short period.  
Unlike contributors, regulators and governments, however, pension fund managers 
may be more interested in short-term performance. Their career and promotion 
prospects, as well as remuneration are typically reviewed on a quarterly or annual basis, 
so naturally achieving good quarterly/annual performance may be more important for 
them than constructing portfolios that will deliver good long-term returns.  Therefore, 
looking at the quarterly/annual performance also conveys some relevant information.   
The second important background feature is that pension funds have flexibility in 
assessing and reporting their performance. At the time of a pension fund’s inception a 
PPB is chosen by its provider as an indicator of the investment style and strategy of the 
                                               
9 “Reveal: The scandal of how pension providers rake in the money”, The Independent, 12 December 
2010. 
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fund. The PPB will be used as the reference point for future performance evaluation 
and is also used as an indicator of the investment style and strategy of the fund for 
marketing purposes. There are three relevant points about these benchmarks. One is 
that a benchmark is assigned by a provider. Second, the benchmarks do not define the 
ultimate asset class for the fund’s investments. This means that funds are allowed to 
invest a fraction of their money outside the benchmark. Third, the period of assessment 
is not uniformly specified. It can differ across funds and time.  
The PPB defines a so-called primary investment focus which classifies funds into a 
range of ABI investment sectors (see Appendix 1 for a list of ABI sectors and our 
grouping of them). However, a fund can invest up to 20% of its money outside its ABI 
sector classification, and, therefore, outside its PPB and retain its ABI sector status. For 
instance, a fund can be classified as specialising in UK equity and have the FTSE All 
Share Index as its PPB, yet it may invest up to 20% of its assets outside its primary 
classification group i.e., in any non-UK listed equity, fixed income domestic and 
foreign securities, and other assets allowable as pension fund investments. This means 
that if pension funds take advantage of this asset allocation flexibility and create 
portfolios containing assets from outside the benchmark, outperforming the benchmark 
may be an ‘easy hurdle’.   
Finally, the third critical background feature that is important for this study is that 
the clear separation of investment styles creates an opportunity to study performance 
characteristics of a range of investment styles. It is common in the literature to focus on 
performance characteristics of domestic equity mutual funds. A similar practice has 
been applied to pension funds. Some studies of occupational pension funds consider 
performance of portfolios diversified across various groups of assets, but there is no 
discussion in the literature of the performance of particular investment styles and it is 
therefore unknown whether the results reported in the past literature are investment 
style specific, or whether they can be generalised across different investment styles. 
The data set used for this paper allows investigation of this issue. 
Given these particular features of the UK personal pension fund market the 
following three themes are developed. 
First, we assess the annual and the long-term performance of pension funds. We are 
interested in observing whether there are any differences in performance resulting from 
using different time horizons in the performance assessment. Consistent with the 
argument of Campbell and Viceira (2002), the short-term performance of a long-term 
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optimal investment strategy may look quite poor, so the question arises whether the 
performance of pension funds looks better when assessed in the long-run than it does 
on an annual basis?  
Second, our interest goes beyond funds specialising in domestic equity and we 
address the question of the performance of a range of investment styles.  On one hand 
‘beating the market’ is hard regardless of what assets define ‘the market’, on the other 
hand, it can be expected that different investment styles deliver different returns. 
Therefore, it is important to gain some understanding of whether and what differences 
there are in the performance of different investment styles. In particular, does taking 
higher risk and investing in equity funds deliver higher returns than investing in lower 
risk funds specialising in fixed income assets?  
Finally, it is important to shed some light on the role of the benchmarks. 
Theoretically, it is impossible to beat the market portfolio, but in practice, given that 
the performance is measured against indexes, it could be possible to outperform these 
indexes if they were inefficient (Kryzanowski and Rahman 2008). This would, 
however, require considerable skills, as detecting these, inefficiencies and being able to 
take advantage of them is not straightforward. However, if the benchmarks are 
inefficient by construction, it does raise the question of their purpose.      
 
 
3. Data  
 
We have collected data for 10,086 funds operated by 63 providers registered in the 
UK using the UK Life and Pension database by Morningstar Direct™. For each fund 
we collected information about the fund’s inception date, provider, classification of its 
investment sector according to the ABI, and monthly returns. We have collected the 
information for all funds that opened between January 1980 and December 2009. 
According to Morningstar, less than 5% of funds are missing at any given time so this 
database covers almost the entire personal pensions market. Across these funds we have 
identified 515 different Primary Prospectus Benchmarks (PPB). To assess performance 
of the PPBs total return statistics on market indexes constituting PPBs were collected 
from DataStream as Morningstar do not provide information on the benchmark returns.  
To calculate meaningful statistics we requested that there were performance data for at 
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least six months. This reduced the total number of funds to 9,659. When the same 
restriction was applied to the PPBs the sample shrunk further.  
Among the 515 benchmarks, 389 were individual market indexes and 126 were 
composite benchmarks. We could not reconstruct all PPBs, either because the weights 
of composite indexes were not provided, and/or their names were not recognised by 
DataStream or identified through web search. In total, we succeeded in calculating 
monthly returns for 369 PPBs corresponding to 4,531 funds.  All overseas index returns 
were converted into pound sterling returns to make them comparable with the fund 
returns. End of month exchange rates were used. Therefore, in the rest of the paper two 
samples are analysed: PPB-unrestricted and PPB-restricted, which refer to 9,659 funds 
with 515 PPBs and 4,531 funds with 369 PPBs, respectively. We discuss the basic 
properties of the PPB-unrestricted sample to document consistency of our findings for 
the PPB-restricted sample. Before, the performance of the PPBs and of the funds are 
discussed, a few words about the structure of the samples are required.  
Each fund can be assigned to one of the 30 investment sectors according to the ABI 
classification. To simplify the analysis we grouped these 30 ABI investment sectors 
into six investment styles: Allocation (ALC), Fixed Income (FI), Emerging Markets 
Equity (EM-E), International Equity (I-E), UK Equity (UK-E), and other (Other). Funds 
are classified as ALC if they invest in a mix of asset classes (e.g., 60% in equity of any 
category and 40% in FI). Other category is created out of the following ABI sectors: 
commodity/energy, money market, global property, UK property, specialist, and 
protected/guaranteed funds. These sectors were put together because there were 
relatively few funds in each of these categories in the PPB-unrestricted sample and even 
less after the PPB-sample was constructed. For instance, it was possible to calculate 
PPB returns for only 32 money market funds out of the population of 326 of the funds 
in the money market category, and none for 361 real estate category funds. Details of 
the grouping are provided in Appendix 1.  
Fig.1 shows the numbers of funds in each of the six investment styles (with EM-E, 
I-E and UK-E combined into Equity) that opened in the period 1980-2009. The statistics 
for the first 20 years, i.e., the period of 1980-1999 are presented on a five-year basis, 
i.e., up to 2000 each bar represents the total number of funds opened in each five-year 
window. The statistics of the last ten years, i.e., 2000-2009 are annual. Fig. 1 shows a 
strong increase in the number of new funds offered to the public after 2000. It also 
shows that the Equity funds are most numerous. In spite of the sharp decline of stock 
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markets in 2008, many funds started to operate during this and the following year.  In 
particular, 918 new Equity funds started to operate in 2008 alone. Given that the 
financial crisis (high stock market fluctuations, decline in economic growth, etc.) 
extended beyond 2008, and the sample ends in 2009, we treat the last two years (i.e., 
2008-2009) with some caution. The effects of the financial crisis may be more 
pronounced in our dataset than other stock market and economic turbulence because of 
the high proportion of funds opened during and immediately before the crisis started. 
Moreover, for the sizable proportion of funds included in the sample that opened in the 
2008-2009 period the annual returns and the compounded returns are calculated over a 
period of 12 months, so they are identical. Therefore, in addition to the whole sample 
of funds operating in the period 1980-2009 we consider a sub-sample of funds that 
opened in the period 2008-2009 and a sample of funds that opened in the period 1980-
2007. The 1980-2007 PPB-unrestricted sub-sample consists of 7,838 funds of which 
4,047 are equity funds. The corresponding statistics for the PPB-restricted sample are 
3,575 and 2,554 respectively.  
 
 
******************* insert Fig. 1 here   ********************* 
Fig. 1 Number of funds opened in the period 1980-2009 per investment style (with EM-E, I-
E and UK-E combined into Equity). The statistics for the period of 1980-1999 are 
presented on a five-year basis. The 2000-2009 statistics are annual 
 
 
 
It is worth noting that the sharp increase in the numbers of offered funds after 2000 
is not associated with an increase in the numbers of providers. At the end of 2009 there 
were 63 pension providers in the personal pensions market which is a moderate increase 
from 58 in 2000. Almost half of these institutions started offering personal pension 
funds in the 1980s and by the early 1990s 45 out of the 63 were already active. 
 
*******************  insert Table 1 here   ********************* 
 
Table 1 shows how many funds and fund-year observations there are for each of the 
six investment styles with the EM-E, I-E, and UK-E grouped together in a category 
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called ‘Equity’ in the total sample (Panel A), the PPB-unrestricted sample (Panel B) 
and  the PPB-restricted sample (Panel C). It is clear that the Equity funds are by far the 
largest group accounting for about half of the operating funds. Within this category the 
I-E and UK-E are most numerous accounting for 28.4% and 19.9% of funds 
respectively. Most importantly, the representation of each investment style is very 
similar between the total sample (Panel A), and the PPB-unrestricted sample (Panel B). 
The PPB-restricted sample (Panel C) has a greater proportion of Equity funds, and a 
reduced proportion of ALC and Other styles. This reflects the difficulty in 
reconstructing composite PPBs for these two groups.  Table 1 Panels D and E show the 
statistics for the 1980-2007 PPB-unrestricted and the PPB-restricted samples 
respectively.  
In addition, monthly time series of 1-month UK T-bills for the period 1980-2009 
have been collected from DataStream. These proxy for the risk-free rate.   
 
 
4. Definition of returns and performance variables 
 
4.1. Returns  
 
To assess the long-term performance of the pension funds the compounded returns 
are calculated over the whole period of fund’s operation within the 1980-2009 period 
and within the 1980-2007 period.  To complete the picture the compounded returns over 
2008-2009 are also calculated, but because for a high proportion of funds there is only 
one annual observation in that period, the 2008-2009 statistics are treated with caution.  
Given that the operational lives of the pension funds differ significantly (some funds 
operate for over 20 years, some for two years only), these total returns are annualised 
and the annualised compounded returns (ACRs) are used in the analysis of long-term 
returns.  The annualised standard deviation of the monthly returns is used as a 
corresponding measure of risk. To check the robustness of our results the (arithmetic) 
average over the funds’ operational life (and sub-periods) is also calculated. We refer 
to these annualised arithmetic average returns as AARs. 
Yearly returns are calculated as compounded monthly returns over each calendar 
year (YRs) and log-returns for each calendar year (YLRs). If a fund operated for less 
than six months in a given calendar year (i.e., opened between July and December), 
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these first few months are not used to calculate YRs and YLRs. First year returns of 
funds opened between January and June are annualised. The focus is on annual (not 
quarterly) returns, because annual reports carry more weight than quarterly reports, to 
avoid further annualisation, and, most importantly, to minimise issues with time-series 
properties in the panel analysis.10 Risk of the yearly returns is calculated as the 
annualised standard deviation of monthly returns in the corresponding calendar year.     
By construction, the samples of yearly returns (YRs and YLRs) are panels, while 
the samples of the ACRs and AARs are cross-sections. Therefore, consistent with our 
intentions, the panel data and the cross-section regressions address different questions. 
One asks whether pension funds on average outperform T-bills and their PPBs, and the 
other one asks whether long-term returns of pension investments are statistically 
different from those earned by reinvesting in T-bills or delivered by the PPBs. The 
corresponding returns on the T-bills and on the PPBs are also calculated as ACRs, 
AARs, YRs and YLRs. 
 
 
4.2. Performance measures 
 
Average retirement savings last about 40 years, with a further 20 years of cashing 
them through retirement, yet the supply of 40 years’ bonds to individual investors is 
practically close to zero. Moreover, unlike in many countries in Continental Europe, it 
is rare for British individual investors to purchase government bonds. Therefore, 
although not totally risk-free, we compare pension funds’ and PPBs’ performance with 
‘rolling-over’ investments in UK 1-month T-bills, i.e., the 1-month UK T-bill rate is 
the proxy for the risk-free rate. The convenience of using a monthly rate is also dictated 
by the fact that pension fund performance statistics are available on a monthly basis, 
too.  
  More precisely, the excess return over the T-bill, hereafter denoted as R-Tbill is 
defined using annual and compounded returns. This measure, does not control for risk 
of any type, and therefore can be criticised for its simplicity. However, given that many 
                                               
10 There are strong time-series properties (e.g., long memory) in the higher frequency data (e.g., 
monthly, and even quarterly) which raised a question on stationarity. We use yearly data, and 
consequently, yearly panels. This gives first order autocorrelation in the residuals i.e. we have 
effectively “shortened” the memory effect.  
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investors may not understand the importance of risk adjustment and it is ‘bare’ returns 
that they appreciate, the measure is included in the analysis. We also calculate the 
excess returns for PPBs, later denoted as PPB-Tbill, as well as the difference between 
the fund return and that of its PPB, hereafter denoted as R-PPB.  
To adjust for risk the Sharpe ratio (Roy, 1952; Sharpe, 1966), denoted later as 
Sharpe, is calculated. The ratio is of particular interest because it is commonly used by 
the fund industries (Ingersoll et al. 2007; Eling, 2008; Antolin, 2008, Hinz et al. 2010).11  
We also use the M2 measure introduced by Modigliani and Modigliani (1997) for 
the direct risk-adjusted comparison of the fund performance against the performance of 
its PPB. Although the M2 is not without criticism (Ingersoll et al. 2007) it is a 
convenient statistic to look at as it gives the difference between the fund and its PPBs 
returns subject to the fund having the same risk as the PPB.  
Given that stock market returns are not normally distributed, to confirm robustness 
of our findings, we also use the Sharpe ratio adjusted for skewness and kurtosis (Pazier 
and White 2006), denoted as SharpeAdj.12 In addition, to gain a better insight into the 
importance of downside risk of investments, the Sortino ratio (Sortino 1991) is 
provided. We use two definitions of a ‘target’, the T-bills and the PPBs, and the 
corresponding Sortino ratios are denoted SortinoTB and SortinoPPB respectively. It can 
be expected that pension portfolios have relatively low volatility, hence the Sharpe ratio 
is more suitable for performance assessment. However, given that our sample includes 
periods of high volatility and, in particular, the 2008 financial crisis has had a dramatic 
impact on returns earned by the pension industry, the Sortino ratio is interesting to look 
at.  
The distributions of the M2 measures, Sharpe ratios, adjusted Sharpe ratios and 
Sortino ratios have been 0.5% winsorized at both tails in order to deal with outliers for 
observations where the denominator was close to zero (Wilcox 2005). 
                                               
11 Given that T-bills are not totally risk free we also defined the Sharpe ratio using the standard 
deviation of R-Tbills and PPB-Tbill for the funds and the PPBs, respectively (e.g., Lo 2002). The 
results were practically identical which is consistent with the fact that the volatility of the annual fund 
and PPB returns is much higher than the annual volatility of the T-bills. We do not present these 
results, but they can be obtained from the authors on request. 
12 In the UK there is legal ambiguity as to whether pension funds are allowed to engage in short-selling. 
Hence, in practice funds either don’t short-sell or if they do, it is to a very small degree. Our data show 
that on average the short positions are below 0.1% of funds’ AUM. Even if it is unlikely that the 
Sharpe ratios can be distorted by short-selling, we use the SharpeAdj to control for effects of non-
normal distribution of returns.  
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We focus on the above defined performance measures and step aside from the 
traditional asset pricing based methods of portfolio valuation for several reasons. First, 
asset pricing models are not suitable for the analysis of long-term returns as asset 
pricing models (CAPM, APT, etc.) require time series of returns. Calculations of 
compounded returns deliver only one observation per fund. Second, asset pricing based 
models are concerned with arithmetic averages as these represent expected values. 
Geometric averaging (i.e., annualised compounded returns) does not fit into this 
notation. Third, probably most importantly, there are no obvious market portfolios 
which could be used to evaluate the performance of the PPBs (e.g., often they are main 
market indexes themselves), and of the funds (e.g., because of the multi-asset class 
nature of pension investment, and because of the high likelihood of funds holding assets 
not included in their PPBs). Given that the holdings of funds are unknown, it is 
impossible to construct convincing proxies for the market portfolios as Kothari and 
Warner (2001) postulate. Finally, to have a direct comparison of the annual and the 
long-term performance of the funds and of the PPBs, it is necessary to use the same 
assessment criteria for their annual and long-term returns.  
 
 
5. Performance evaluation  
 
The analysis of the performance is based on panel (using YRs, YLRs) and cross-
section (using ACRs, AARs) regressions where the performance measures defined in 
Section 4.2 are regressed on a constant, i.e., the regressions are of the form 
 
performance measure =  + , 
 
with the panel regressions having additional fund and year fixed effects. The 
‘performance measure’ refers to one of the seven performance measures defined in 
Section 4.2, and  denotes an error term. To deal with heteroskedasticity, 
autocorrelation and spatial correlation, and the unbalanced nature of the panel data the 
Hoechle method (Hoechle 2007) with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors (Driscoll and 
Kraay 1998) for unbalanced panels was applied to obtain robust and unbiased 
estimators (it was sufficient to use one lag in the specification of the autocorrelation 
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term). The reported estimates are averages across all the funds. The (OLS) cross-section 
regressions were clustered by provider to control for heteroskedasticity.   
The core analysis is based on the PPB-restricted sample of 4,531 funds for which 
the performance of their PPBs could be calculated. However, where possible the 
regressions were also run for the PPB-unrestricted sample of 9,659 funds to ensure that 
the results are not sub-sample specific. Moreover, each sample was divided into six 
investment-style sub-samples (as defined in Section 4), and the whole period of 
investigation (i.e., 1980-2009) was divided in two sub-periods, 1980-2007 and 2008-
2009. We look at each investment style separately to shed some light on potential 
benefits of investing in them. The period of the data availability was split into the 1980-
2007 and the 2008-2009 sub-periods to ensure that the results are not driven by the 
performance of the disproportionately high number of crisis-born funds, and to shed 
some light on the performance of the funds at the start of the financial crisis. To address 
the latter, the sample was additionally split into two subsamples: funds that started to 
operate prior to the financial crisis and funds that started to operate in 2008 and 2009. 
Given that many of these combinations of the sample divisions produced very 
similar results we present only a selection of them to save space. The remaining 
regressions can be obtained from the authors on request.  
 
 
5.1. Performance based on average returns 
 
We start from discussing the panel regression results obtained for the yearly returns 
(YRs) as those are commonly used in the literature and in communication with 
contributors. Table 2 shows the estimated average performance for the 1980-2009 
(Panels A and B) and the 1980-2007 (Panels C and D) periods. The performance 
measures based on the PPB-restricted sample of 4,531 funds are presented in Panels A 
and C, and based on the PPB-unrestricted sample of 9,659 funds are shown in Panels B 
and D.  
 
 
******************* insert Table 2 here   ********************* 
 
 
17 
 
Tables 2 documents that, on average, over the whole period of 1980-2009 the 
pension funds outperformed their PPBs by 2.57% in nominal and 2.97% in risk adjusted 
terms on an annual bases. Looking at individual investment styles, all R-PPB and M2 
are positive and all of them are statistically significantly different from zero at 1% and 
5% except those obtained for the Other category. The risk adjusted performance (M2) 
is typically slightly higher than the nominal difference (R-PPB) for all the investment 
styles but FI. The funds specialising in domestic equity outperform their benchmarks 
(in the vast majority of cases, the FTSE index) by 2.73% in nominal terms and 3.15% 
after adjusting for risk. The FI funds have the highest level of nominal outperformance 
among the six investment styles. However, the EM-E funds perform best in risk 
adjusted terms by beating their PPBs by 5.18% on an annual basis. Even the FI funds, 
earn 3.08% per annum more than their PPBs.   
The statistical outperformance of the PPBs is confirmed when the financial crisis is 
excluded from the analysis for all the investment styles but EM-E for which no 
statistical significance of the averages is obtained (Panel C).  There are, however, some 
differences in the size of the outperformance. The exclusion of the crisis years seems 
to be associated with lower M2s for all the investment styles by FI. The nominal 
outperformance is slightly higher for the FI and the UK-E funds, but lower for the other 
investment styles. All-in-all, the EM-E funds’ performance seems most affected by the 
exclusion of the crisis years with M2 and R-PPB dropping from 5.18% (statistically 
significant at 5%) and 2.56% (statistically significant at 1%) respectively for 1980-2009 
to -0.36% and 0.86% (both statistically insignificantly different from zero) respectively 
for 1980-2007. 
The picture changes radically when the pension funds’ returns are compared against 
the T-bills. Here, only the EM-E funds consistently outperform the T-bills in nominal 
and risk-adjusted terms.  This result is preserved when the PPB unrestricted samples 
are used in the regressions, i.e., when the sample of 9,659 funds for the whole period 
(Panel B) and the sample of 7,405 funds for the 1980-2007 period (Panel D) are used. 
The EM-E funds outperform T-bills in nominal terms by 19.29% per annum in the PPB-
restricted sample and by 17.04% in the PPB-unrestricted sample (both statistically 
significant at1%) when the financial crisis’ years are excluded from the calculations. 
The inclusion of the crisis years lowers the level of outperformance to 18.62% for the 
PPB-restricted sample and 16.71% for the PPB-unrestricted sample (statistical 
significance of 10% and 5% is obtained for these estimates respectively).  
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5% statistical significance is also obtained for the Sharpe ratios of the I-E and UK-
E funds over the 1980-2007 period, but this result is diluted in the PPB-unrestricted 
sample. The Other category is the only group of funds for which the statistically 
significant underperformance is obtained for the Sharpe ratios for the PPB-unrestricted 
samples (Panels B and D) and the PPB-restricted before the financial crisis (Panel C). 
However, given the high mix of this group, it is difficult to interpret this result. 
To get some understanding of the impact of the financial crisis Table 3 presents the 
estimated performance statistics for 2008-2009. Panel A presents the results obtained 
for the sample of funds that started to operate before the financial crisis.13  Panel B 
shows the results for the funds that started to operate during the financial crisis.  
 
 
******************* insert Table 3 here   ********************* 
 
 
Table 3 Panel A shows a pattern similar to that observed in Table 2, i.e., the 
statistical significance is observed for the R-PPR and M2 but not for the T-bills and 
Sharpe. It documents that, on average, the funds incepted during the financial crisis 
(Panels C and D) performed better than the older funds (Panels A and B).  These ‘older’ 
funds were still successful in outperforming their benchmarks (except for the FI funds) 
but were not so good at outperforming the T-bills.  
In contrast, the newly created funds were exceptionally good at outperforming the 
T-bills both in nominal and risk adjusted terms. They were also successful in 
outperforming their benchmarks. The UK-E funds seem to have the least impressive 
performance (lowest coefficients and statistical significance). 
In sum, the average performance of funds, when it comes to beating their PPBs 
seems quite good. Whatever investment style and period are taken, there is no sign of 
statistically significant underperformance. Indeed, even if 2008-2009 were tough years 
for investors, the funds managed to outperform their benchmarks. Can this be taken as 
a sign that contributors have nothing to worry about? How does this result marry with 
                                               
13 The small difference in the numbers of observations between Tables 2 and 3 results from the fact that 
a few funds created in the second half of 2007 are excluded from the performance analysis of 1980-
2007 but enter the regressions for the 2008-2009 period.  
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the evidence of the lack of outperformance of the T-bills? To address these questions 
we first look at the compounded returns before we look at the performance of the PBBs.    
Given the similarity of the results obtained for the PPB-unrestricted and the PPB-
restricted samples, to save space, only the results obtained for the PPB-restricted sample 
are presented in the rest of the paper.  
 
 
5.2 Performance based on compounded returns  
 
Tables 4 and 5 keep the format of Tables 2 and 3 respectively, but show the results 
obtained for the annualised compounded returns, ACRs. More precisely, Table 4 shows 
the performance statistics for the 1980-2009 and the 1980-2007 periods. Table 5 
presents the performance over 2008-2009 of the funds created before (Panel A) and 
during (Panel B) the financial crisis. In addition to the performance measures shown in 
Tables 2 and 3, the Sharpe ratio adjusted for skewness and kurtosis, SharpeAdj, and 
two Sortino ratios, SortinoTB and SortinoPPB are presented to illustrate the robustness of 
the findings.      
 
 
*******************  insert Table 4 here   ********************* 
 
 
*******************  insert Table 5 here   ********************* 
 
In contrast with the results obtained for YRs, the averages estimated for all the 
performance measures over the 1980-2009 and the 1980-2007 periods show that the 
funds are quite successful in outperforming T-bills, too. Now, all the estimates obtained 
for R-Tbill and Sharpe are statistically significantly positive except those of the UK-E 
funds when the performance is measured over 1980-2009. When the financial crisis is 
excluded the three groups of funds specialising in equity outperform T-bills in nominal 
and risk adjusted terms. The EM-E funds have earned above the T-bills as much as 
26.70% per annum, the I-E have earned 4.48% per annum and the UK-E funds have 
earned 3.34% per annum. When the risk is taken into account the equity funds still 
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perform better than the other investment categories having the Sharpe ratios of 1.46, 
0.33 and 0.33 (all significant at 1%).  
The picture is slightly different for the FI funds which underperformed T-bills in 
nominal (-1.53%) and risk adjusted terms (-0.39%). Given that the ALC funds can be 
seen as a combination of equity and fixed-income assets, their relatively weak 
performance is probably a consequence of the poor performance of fix-income 
investments.   
When the financial crisis years are added to the performance calculations (Table 4 
Panel A) the performance of the equity finds declines with the EM-E and the I-E funds 
earning 10.81% p.a. and 2.79% p.a. respectively more than the T-bills. The UK-E funds 
are the only investment style that has not (statistically significantly) outperform the T-
bills. In contrast, the performance of the FI funds improves. Now, the FI funds 
outperform the T-bills by 2.03% p.a. in nominal terms and have statistically 
significantly Sharpe of 0.27. 
Using ACRs preserves the results of Table 2 for the comparison of the funds and 
their PPBs, i.e., funds outperform their PPBs in nominal and risk-adjusted terms except 
for the EM-E funds over the 1980-2007 period.   
The performance statistics estimated for the financial crisis period (Table 5) are 
highly statistically significant which contrasts with the results presented for the YRs in 
Table 3. It is clear that ‘old’ funds were harder hit by the turbulent markets than the 
‘young’ ones. In particular, the equity funds created in 2008-2009 performed well on 
recovering stock markets (their R-Tbill and Sharpe estimates are positive and 
statistically significant) while the ‘old’ funds highly statistically underperformed T-bills 
which may be behind the lack of statistical significance of the UK-E funds in Table 4 
Panel A. The London Stock Exchange lost 8.2% between 1 January 2008 and 31 
December 2009.   
The ability to beat the PPBs is also different for the two cohorts: the ‘old’ funds 
outperform the PPBs in nominal terms but underperform them after risk adjustment. 
The ‘young’ funds outperform the PPBs in risk adjusted terms, but not in nominal terms.  
Given that non-normally distributed samples can deliver biased Sharpe ratios each 
panel of Tables 4 and 5 shows the average estimates of SharpeAdj, SortinoTB and 
SortinoPPB. The SharpeAdj statistics are comparable to the Sharpe ratios estimated for 
the whole period (Table 4 Panel A) and for the funds created during the financial crisis 
(Table 5 Panel B). However, considerable differences in sign and statistical significance 
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are observed when the financial crisis is excluded from the calculations (Table 4 panel 
A) and for the ‘old’ funds during the financial crisis. While the period of the financial 
crisis can, to some extent, be expected to have ‘non-normal’ properties, it is interesting 
that when the financial crisis years are excluded funds seem to have considerable 
asymmetries in their returns structures with the equity funds being negatively and fixed 
income funds being positively biased.      
The Sortino ratios further highlight differences between the FI and the equity funds, 
as well as differences in relativity of performance. More precisely, the outperformance 
of the PPBs does not always mean making money. For instance, the negative SortinoTB 
and the positive SortinoPPB ratios estimated for the equity funds (Table 5 Panel A) 
suggest that the probability of losing money was considerable for funds that had 
substantial equity holdings when the stock markets crashed. Even if the funds did not 
lose as much money as their PPBs, in comparison with the positive yields of the T-bills, 
they did not performed well.        
In summary, there are substantial differences between performance measured using 
the ACRs and using the YRs. On one hand, the coefficients for the YR-based 
regressions are larger than those estimated for the ACRs. On the other hand, there is 
more statistical significance, especially in comparison with the T-bills in the ACR-
based regressions. This higher statistical significance may, however, disclose 
statistically significant losses as much as gains.   While it can be expected that the size 
of the estimates differ with the length of the period of the calculations, the differences 
in statistical significance of the estimates may seem less intuitive.  In the next sections 
we explore in more detail potential explanations for our findings.  
 
 
6. How to make sense out of it?  
 
6.1.  Why it may be hard to beat T-Bills on an annual basis?  
 
The analysis of the YR-based performance measures shows that the funds do not 
outperform T-bills (Table 2), while the ACR-based measures (Table 4) document that 
they do.  It may seem a bit puzzling why the funds outperform the PPBs but fail to 
outperform the T-bills, even though the coefficients estimated for the R-Tbills are 
frequently comparable with those estimated for R-PPB. Clearly, the difference is in the 
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size of the standard errors. If the funds succeed in tracking their PPBs, R-PPBs may 
have a smaller variance than R-Tbills. Indeed, the more volatile the PPBs are in 
comparison with the T-bills, the higher the volatility of the R-Tbills will be which may 
affect statistical significance of the performance statistics based on the T-bills in the 
panel regressions.  
Moreover, many of the estimates for R-Tbills presented in Table 4 are smaller than 
the equivalent statistics presented in Table 2, yet this time they are highly statistically 
significant. Again, the difference seems to be in the size of the standard errors. It is 
important to keep in mind that the ACRs based regressions look ‘directly’ at the 
variability of the performance measures across the funds, i.e., the ‘within-fund’ 
variability is suppressed by compounding. Therefore, it does not really matter how 
volatile R-Tbills were for each fund, because the statistical significance of the averages 
presented in Table 4 tells us that the variability across the funds was low.  
To make these points more formally, let us assume that a manager can create a 
portfolio, P, that earns a mean return RP, has the same risk as the PPB, i.e., P = PPB  
and is perfectly correlated with the PPB. Then the difference RP-RPPB is statistically 
significantly different from zero for as long as RP ≠ RPPB, because P-PPB = 0. However, 
the comparison of RP and Rfree may not be statistically significant. More specifically, 
R-Rfree = P ≠ 0, and the corresponding t-statistic, P
freeRRN

)(  , may not be greater than 
the corresponding critical value for the Student’s distribution with 2N-2 degrees of 
freedom when the portfolio returns are highly volatile (N denotes the number of 
observations). 
The assessment of the long-term performance is a slightly different story. The 
comparison of the compounded returns is undertaken in a cross-section of funds. Here, 
if funds’ investments are similar (and there is a substantial literature documenting 
herding among fund managers), there may be relatively low variability across funds 
and therefore, more statistical significance. To see that let us assume that all funds are 
created at the same time and benchmarked to the same PPB. Moreover, if all managers 
attempt to create portfolios that (i) have risk similar to the risk of their PPBs and (ii) 
have higher average returns, while there is a little variation in what assets they add to 
the basic portfolio that defines their fund’s ABI investment style, then it is very likely 
that the variability of RP-RPPB across funds may be small. This would result in high 
statistical significance of the results.  
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6.2. Arithmetic and geometric returns 
 
It could also be puzzling that the performance statistics estimated for the YR-based 
measures are not always bigger than those for the ACR-based measures. Surely, the 
ACR based R-Tbills or R-PPR should not exceed their arithmetic means. It is important 
to stress that the comparison between Tables 2 and 4, and Tables 3 and 5 is not a 
straightforward comparison between geometric and arithmetic returns. Tables 2 and 3 
show the average (after controlling for fund and year specific effects) performance 
statistics, while Tables 4 and 5 show the results of cross-sectional regressions. In other 
words, the YR-based measures are not arithmetic mean equivalents of the ACR-based 
measures.  
By definition, it is impossible to construct a panel of total compounded returns. 
Therefore, to show that the findings documented in Tables 2-5 result from 
distinguishing between returns calculated over the whole period of operation and 
returns calculated for shorter time intervals we have repeated the analysis using the 
performance measures based on the AARs and YLRs.  
The AARs similarly to ACRs inform about the funds’ performance over the whole 
operational life save that the AARs are the arithmetic averages while the ACRs are the 
geometric averages (both annualised). Following from that it can be expected that the 
estimates obtained for the AAR-based measures should be higher than those estimated 
for the ACR-based measures. 
To further test the robustness of our findings and correctness of the argument that 
the period of return calculations matters, we repeated the panel analysis using log-
returns, YLRs. By construction log-returns are easily convertible into total returns and 
this might create an expectation that using long returns in a panel regression answers 
the question about the total return (after de-logging the results). This is, however, not 
the case as the nature of the panel regressions preserves the focus on the ‘within-fund’ 
variability and impacts on statistical significance of the findings.  
To save space we present the results for the 1980-2009 and the 1980-2007 periods 
as these are most important from the long-term perspective. Tables 6 and 7 present the 
regression results estimated for the AAR-based and the YLR-based measures 
respectively. The estimates of R-PPB, M2, R-Tbill for the YLR-based regressions have 
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been multiplied by 100 to make them comparable with those presented in the other 
tables. 
 
*******************  insert Table 6 here   ********************* 
 
 
******************* insert Table 7 here   ********************* 
 
 
It is clear that Tables 6 and 7 repeat closely the pattern of statistical significance of 
Tables 4 and 2 respectively (save for the fact that Table 7 shows the results for 
AdjSharpe and the Sortino ratios and does not show the PPB-unrestricted sample 
results).  The YLR-based regressions, like the equivalent YR-based regressions, show 
that the funds are quite successful in outperforming their PPBs but not so good at 
outperforming the T-bills. The AAR-based regressions, like the ACR-based 
counterparts, show that the funds outperform both their PPBs and the T-bills. These 
results strengthen the argument presented in Section 6.1 that the statistical significance 
is related to the way the returns are calculated, i.e., whether the regressions are used to 
assess performance over a particular period of time or its sub-periods. 
The comparison of Tables 4 and 6 also shows that, consistent with our expectations, 
using arithmetic averaging inflates the performance statistics as the AAR-based 
performance statistics of Table 6 exceed the ACR-based statistics of Table 4.  
At this point one could still wonder how it is possible that so much outperformance 
is found. The next section sheds some light on the issue. 
 
 
6.3. How to beat the benchmark? 
 
The regression results presented so far show consistently that pension funds 
outperform their PPBs. The level of outperformance is statistically and economically 
significant. For instance, the UK-E funds have the ACR 1.98% higher than their PPBs 
(i.e., FTSE All Shares in 86% of cases, and the remaining cases sub-indices of FTSE) 
over the period 1980-2009 (Table 4). This outperformance increases to 2.84% when the 
financial crisis years are excluded from the analysis. The differences are too high to be 
25 
 
potentially attributed to inefficiencies of the FTSE index. A similar argument applies 
to all the other investment styles: it cannot be expected that all the other benchmarks 
are inefficient enough to explain the high levels of the outperformance. How is it then 
possible that the funds outperform their PPBs? 
A possible explanation of this ability to outperform the PPBs is that the PPBs are 
inefficient given the true asset spectrum invested in by pension funds.  Fig. 2 presents 
a simple illustration of how managers could outperform their PPBs when they invest in 
a broader asset class than used to calculate their PPB.   
Let us denote the risk-free rate of return as Rfree, and the solid line represents the 
frontier based on all assets included in the PPB.  For simplicity of argument, let us 
assume that the PPB is the market portfolio as defined by the mean-variance 
optimisation argument. If the Sharpe ratio is the measure of performance, replicating 
the PPB allocation is the best a fund can do (ignoring transaction costs). However, if 
funds are allowed to invest outside their PPBs, then enriching their portfolios by assets 
that have low correlation with the assets included in their PPB expands the frontier, as 
shown by the dotted line.14  
 
 
**************** insert Fig. 2 here ************** 
Fig. 2 Expansion of a frontier when additional assets are included. The dotted line 
denotes the frontier when additional asset are added to the ‘basic’ frontier. PPB and M 
denote market portfolios determined by the frontiers and the risk free rate. P denotes 
the efficient portfolio on the extended frontier that has the same risk as PPB 
 
 
 
Obviously, M is the best allocation point as measured by the Sharpe ratio. 
However, even if the Sharpe ratio is highest at M, it may not be optimal for pension 
funds to try to replicate its asset composition. If pension fund managers are expected to 
track their PPB, the best strategy may be to try to create a portfolio along the line P-
PPB. It will deliver a higher return for the same level of risk with point P representing 
the portfolio with the same risk as the PPB and the highest achievable return. It is 
                                               
14 Given that it is rather unlikely that perfectly negative assets will be added to the existing portfolios, 
and there is a restriction on how much of these ‘non-PPB’ assets can be added (max 20% according to 
the ABI classification), it is unlikely that the risk of this new, ‘extended’, portfolio can be reduced to 
zero. 
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important to note that, if it is not known what additional assets are added to the PPB-
tracking portfolio, the efficiency losses that arise as a result of investing in P rather than 
M cannot be assessed. On paper, pension investments perform better in nominal and 
risk-adjusted terms than their PPBs whereas, in practice, they may not even be 
achieving their efficient position given their investment constraint. 
To illustrate that the above argument can explain the scale of the outperformance 
we look more closely at the UK-E funds as this group has the highest level of PPB 
homogeneity. We calculate returns of a hypothetical portfolio consisting of 80% of the 
FTSE All Share index and 20% of an emerging market index. We used several MSCI 
emerging market indexes commonly used as PPBs for EM-E funds. More specifically, 
we used MSCI Emerging Market index, MSCI Emerging Markets–Latin America 
index, MSCI Pacific except Japan index, as well as MSCI indexes for individual 
countries (Brazil, China and India). We used several periods of performance 
assessment. First we looked at the 2000-2009 period, as the longest period for which 
all these indexes are available. Next, we looked at two sub-periods, 2005-2009 and 
2008-2009 to give some feel for robustness of our findings. Using these returns we 
evaluated the performance of the 80-20 portfolio in relation to the FTSE All Share 
index. The results for the ACRs are presented in Table 8. 
 
 
****************** insert Table 8 here *********** 
 
 
It is clear that the 80-20 portfolio outperformed the FTSE All Share index in 
nominal and risk adjusted terms for all the emerging markets indexes used to construct 
the portfolio and all the sub-periods. Moreover, the level of outperformance is 
substantial and comparable with the performance statistics reported in Table 4 for the 
UK-E funds versus their PPBs. This means that the simple investment strategy of 
keeping 20% of the portfolio in one of the emerging markets’ indexes and the remaining 
80% on the London Stock Exchange, would allow funds to maintain their UK-E 
classification, use the FTSE All Share index as the PPB, and yet, comfortably “beat the 
market”.  
Therefore, this leads us to the conclusion that it is possible that the UK-E funds 
outperformance of their PPBs may be a consequence of some fraction of their AUM 
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being invested in assets other than stocks listed on the LSE. This diversification outside 
the main ABI specialisation classification allows the funds to outperform their PPBs. 
There is formally nothing to complain about, as such diversification benefits 
contributors but it is hard to consider the current PPBs a real investment challenge.   
To further illustrate the risk-return characteristics of the sample, Fig. 3 shows the 
annualised ACRs versus their corresponding standard deviations for the funds and their 
PPBs. It shows the averages for all the funds (ALL) and the six individual investment 
styles for the four combinations of the sub-samples and the periods as presented in 
Tables 4-5.15  
 
 
******************* insert Fig. 3 here   ********************* 
Fig. 3 Average risk-return characteristics of funds (denoted by F_ and the 
abbreviation of the investment style name; diamond shapes) and their PPBs (denoted 
by B_ and the abbreviation of the investment style name; circle shapes) based on 
annualised compounded returns, ACRs. Investment styles: ALC – allocation, FI – 
fixed income, EM-E – emerging markets equity, I-E – international equity, UK-E – 
UK equity, and Other – all other styles. Panel a shows risk/return characteristics in 
1980-2009; panel b shows risk/return characteristics in 1980-2007; panel c shows 
risk/return characteristics in 2008-2009 of the funds created in 1980-2007; panel d 
shows risk/return characteristics of the funds created in 2008-2009 
 
 
 
The graphical representation of the statistics hidden behind the differences 
presented in Tables 4 and 5 helps to visualise the extent to which funds’ returns are 
positioned vertically above the returns earned by the PPBs on the risk-return plain. This 
suggests that the explanation for the UK-E funds provided above, that funds diversify 
their portfolios beyond assets defining their PPBs, is quite plausible for all the 
investment styles. It is interesting that the outperformance of the PPBs is so strongly 
visible for the funds that were created during the financial crisis. These funds have very 
few observations, yet, they are already structured in such a way that, on average, they 
outperform their benchmarks.  
                                               
15 We do not present the corresponding YRs graphs to save space. They are very similar to the 
presented ones. 
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Fig. 3 also indicates that relying on the PPB-related performance measures may 
create a spurious feeling of safety. The period used in the study stretches between 1980-
2009 but, as Fig. 1 illustrates, the majority of the funds have been created between 
2000-2009, with more than a half being created between 2005 and 2009, i.e., when 
equity markets grew sharply before the financial crisis and then sharply declined during 
the financial crisis. In general, the 2000-2009 period has not been easy for equity 
investors. The collapse of the markets after the burst of the dot-com boom resulted in 
substantial losses and the shift to ‘safer’ fixed income investments have resulted in low 
returns on bonds.  
  Given that funds, despite being more volatile, struggle to statistically outperform 
T-bills on an annual basis and that the funds outperform the PPB suggests that it might 
be expected that the PPBs do not outperform the T-bills either. However, it is not clear 
what the performance of the PPBs based on compounded returns is. Table 9 suggests 
that it is not particularly good. To minimise  multiple counting of PPBs, which could 
occur when several funds with the same PPB were opened in a same calendar month, 
the regressions are run under the restriction that if several funds were incepted with the 
same PPB at the same calendar month, that PPB enters the regressions only once. This 
procedure reduced the number of observations by half with the strongest impact on the 
UK-E PPBs whose representation declined from 1,364 to 303 entries.  Moreover, given 
that all the benchmarks were created before 2008, there are no ‘old’ and ‘new’ PPBs 
and Table 9 provides one set of performance statistics for 2008-2009. 
 
 
*******************  insert Table 9 here  ******************* 
 
 
The performance statistics based on YRs and ACRs resemble those presented in 
Tables 2 and 3 for funds. In the case of the PPBs, as with funds, there is robust evidence 
of statistical outperformance for the EM-E PPBs. In contrast with the statistics the FI 
PPBs show stronger statistical outperformance during the financial crisis but also a 
stronger statistical underperformance in the years before the financial crisis.  The ACR-
based performance (Panel B) also confirms the earlier results for the equity and the FI 
investment styles.  
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The multiple entries of the PPBs have been restricted by removing those 
observations that had several identical PPBs entering in the same calendar month, but 
this might not be enough to completely overcome overrepresentation of some periods 
of high entry by the pension funds. Therefore, the reported statistics may be still driven 
by high concentration of observations in particular periods of time.   
 
 
7. Summary and Conclusions 
 
This paper provides the first comprehensive and large scale analysis of the 
performance of personal pension funds in relation to their Primary Prospectus 
Benchmarks (PPBs).  The study covers 9,659 personal pension funds from across 30 
ABI investment sectors that operated in the UK between 1980 and 2009. We succeeded 
in reconstructing returns of the PPBs for 4,531 pension funds, and use these returns to 
assess the funds perform in relation to these benchmarks. The performance measured 
by ordinary excess returns over the UK T-bills and over PPBs, as well as the Sharpe 
ratio, Sharpe ratio adjusted for skewness and kurtosis, Sortino ratio in relation to the 
UK T-bills and PPBs, and the Modigliani-Modigliani measure (M2) are calculated for 
arithmetic, geometric and log returns. The results reveal that in contrast with the 
previous research, pension funds may be performing better than previously reported, at 
least with regard to benchmarks. Below we provide a brief summary of the findings and 
a discussion of the implications of the research. Two, interconnected implications seem 
to be particularly important. 
The results reveal that in contrast with the previous research, having looked at 
different horizons and broader set of investment styles, pension funds may be 
performing better than previously reported. We document that on average pension 
funds outperform their PPBs in nominal and risk adjusted terms both on the annual and 
the long-term basis. We also find that on average pension funds outperform T-bills (in 
nominal and in risk adjusted terms) in the long-run. On average, on an annual basis 
pension funds’ compounded returns are 2.17% higher than those of T-bills over the 
period 1980-2009, and 3.46% for the 1980-2007 period. This means that if annual fees 
are about 1%-1.8%, contributors may still be left with a bit more than an investment in 
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the T-bills would deliver, unless hidden charges wipe out even those small gains.16 The 
funds specialising in emerging markets equities are, on average, most profitable 
delivering 10.8% and 26.70% over the 1980-2009 and 1980-2007 period respectively. 
The next in line are the funds specialising in international equities with the returns 
2.79% and 4.476% over the 1980-2009 and 1980-2007 period respectively. The 
performance of the most common investment styles (allocation, fixed income and 
domestic, i.e., UK, equity) is not so impressive.  The funds specialising in UK equity 
were particularly badly affected by the market crash during the financial crisis.  The 
fixed income focused funds have provided a better shelter during the financial crisis, 
but their pre-crisis performance was not that impressive.  The allocation funds, as a 
combination of fixed income and equity funds, provide some smoothing of the 
fluctuations of the fixed income and equity portfolios, but overall their performance 
seems inferior to that of funds specialising in oversees equities. This result is consistent 
with the diversification argument, however, it does not offer an ultimate solution for 
pension saving allocation. The risk of overseas funds, and in particular those 
specialising in emerging markets, is much higher than the risk of any other investment 
styles. This, high risk exposure may not be agreeable with a preferred risk profile of 
many pension contributors.  Moreover, the reported high returns earned by the emerging 
market indexes and the funds specialising in emerging markets should be treated with 
caution.   
The performance analysis based on annual returns shows that on average pension 
funds outperformed their PPBs but did not outperform T-bills, except for funds 
specialising in emerging markets equity. This finding indicates that the analysis of the 
performance of pension funds using average yearly returns may be misleading. This is 
because, if in the short-run pension funds attempt to mimic, to some extent, risk-return 
characteristics of their assigned benchmarks, then the lack of statistical significance of 
the annual excess returns may be the result of high risk differentials between the PPBs 
and the T-bills. However, in the long-run, i.e., when compounded returns over the 
period of pension fund’s operation are accounted for, these differences in risk get 
diluted and pension fund performance in comparison with T-bills may improve in 
statistical terms.  
                                               
16 There is growing pressure on pension funds providing define contribution schemes to disclose their 
full costs (“UK pension providers set to be forced to disclose costs”, Financial Times, 24 February 
2014) 
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There are two interconnected implications stemming from these results. The first 
concerns benchmarks and whether they are challenging or not. The paper shows that all 
investment styles outperform the PPBs both on an annual and long term basis. This 
suggests that the benchmarks that funds choose are not particularly challenging. We 
argue that this may be the result of funds investing in broader asset classes than those 
used to define their PPBs. For example, funds are allowed to invest up to 20% of the 
AUM in a broader asset class than those defining their PPB. Such investment practices 
are not forbidden and are consistent with the ABI classification but make the existing 
PPBs inefficient benchmarks. The paper uses an example of an 80-20 allocation 
between the FTSE All Share Index and selected emerging market indexes to illustrate 
that such a strategy can deliver substantial returns and be a plausible explanation of the 
scale of outperformance identified in the paper. Outperforming the benchmark seems a 
desirable thing, but this has limited value if it is achieved in an inefficient way, e.g., by 
adopting a non-challenging benchmark rather than one that is a true reflection of the 
investment strategies available to the fund. Tying a portfolio’s risk to the one of its 
benchmark is likely to result in sub-optimal asset allocation than could be achieved if 
the full scale of investment opportunities for investment asset classes included in the 
portfolio were explored.  Our research suggests that benchmarks, and the fact that funds 
have beaten the benchmark, would be far more informative if the benchmarks were a 
better reflection of the underlying investment strategy permitted within the relevant 
ABI classification of the fund. Currently these are not available for investors.  This 
raises the question whether there should be greater scrutiny of the process of opening 
new pension funds and monitoring their subsequent performance. 
The second implication relates to the timeframe. The results of the paper show that 
the annual and the long-term performance of funds differ not just in levels but also in 
statistical significance. Using geometric averaging to assess the long-tern performance 
shows greater statistical significance in comparison with T-bills compared to those 
based on yearly returns. This distinction between timeframe is not observed with PPBs. 
This seems to be a result of pension funds being constructed to have similar risk 
characteristics as those of the PPBs and being more diversified. So, as is shown in the 
paper, a focus on short-term assessments does not typically provide statistically 
significant measures of comparative performance against T-bills and so pushes the 
focus towards PPBs, which as we have indicated are not unduly challenging. 
Broadening the focus toward inclusion of longer term assessment of performance would 
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increase the scope for statistically significant assessment against T-bills.  T-bills are 
less volatile than equity, and even bonds, so if an investor wishes to get some 
understanding of how much money he/she can hope to have in their pension pot at 
retirement, it may be more informative to test the investment in terms of its return above 
the average T-bill rate than above a more volatile index.  Thus bringing additional 
longer term performance assessment into the picture increases the scope for assessment 
and can help broaden the focus beyond performance against PPBs.  
 
 
 
8. References 
Agudo LF, Lázaro CO (2005) Does mutual fund management in India correspond to 
its investment objective classification? Rev Pacific Basin Financ Markets 
Policies 8(4): 659-685 
Ambachtsheer K, Capelle R, Sheibelhut T (1998) Improving Pension Fund 
Performance. Financ Anal J 54(6): 15-21 
Antolin  P (2008) Pension Fund Performance. OECD Working Papers on Insurance 
and Private Pensions 
Aydogdu M, Wellman JW (2011) The effects of advertising on mutual fund flows: 
Results for a new database. Financ Manage 40(3): 785-809 
Asset Management in the UK 2012-2013: The IMA Annual Survey (2013) Investment 
Management Association (IMA), London 
Bailey BA, Heck JL, Wilkens KA (2005) International mutual fund performance and 
political risk. Rev Pacific Basin Financ Markets Policies 8(1): 167-184 
Blake D (2003) Pension Schemes and Pension Funds in the United Kingdom. Oxford 
University Press 
Blake D, Lehmann BN, Timmermann A (1999) Asset Allocation Dynamics and 
Pension Fund Performance. J Bus 72(4): 429-461 
Blake D, Lehmann BN, Timmermann A (2002) Performance clustering and incentives 
in the UK pension fund industry. J Asset Manage 3(2): 173 - 194 
Blake D, Timmermann A (1998) Mutual Fund Performance: Evidence from the UK. 
Eur Financ Rev 2(1): 57-77 
Blum ME, Friend I (1975) The asset structure of individual portfolios and some 
implications for utility functions. J Finance 30(2): 585-603 
33 
 
Bollen NPB, Busse JA (2005) Short-Term Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance. 
Rev Financ Stud 18(2): 569-597 
Brown SJ, Goetzmann WN (1995) Performance Persistence. J Finance 50(2): 679-698 
Brown G, Draper P, McKenzie E (1997) Consistency of UK Pension Fund Investment 
Performance. J Bus Financ Acc 24(2): 155-178 
Campbell JY, Viceira LM (2002) Strategic asset allocation: portfolio choice for long-
term investors, Oxford University Press, USA 
Capocci D, Corhay A, Hübner G (2005) Hedge fund performance and persistence in 
bull and bear markets. Eur J Finance 11(5): 361-392 
Carhart MM (1997) On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance. J Finance 52(1): 57-
82 
Chan L, Dimmock S, Lakonishok J (2009) Benchmarking money manager 
performance: Issues and evidence. Rev Financ Stud 22(11): 4553-4599 
Chen SS (2009) Predicting the bear stock market: Macroeconomic variables as 
leading indicators. J Bank Finance 33(2): 211-223 
Chu PK, McKenzie M (2008) A study on stock selection and market-timing 
performance: Evidence from Hong Kong Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF). 
Rev Pacific Basin Financ Markets Policies 11(4): 617-649 
Chordia T, Roll R, Subrahmanyam A (2001) Market liquidity and trading activity. J 
Finance56(2): 501-530 
Cochrane JH (2014) A mean-variance benchmark for intertemporal portfolio theory. J 
Finance 69(1): 1-49 
Coggin TD, Fabozzi FJ, Rahman S (1993) The Investment Performance of U.S. 
Equity Pension Fund Managers: An Empirical Investigation. J Finance 48(3): 
1039-1055 
Cohen R, Coval J, Pastor L (2005) Judging fund managers by the company they keep. 
J Finance 60: 1057-1096 
Cooper MJ, Gulen H, Rau PR (2005) Changing names with style: mutual fund name 
changes and their effects on fund flows. J Finance 60(6): 2825-2858 
Cuthbertson K, Nitzsche D, O’Sullivan N (2008 UK mutual fund performance: Skill 
or luck? J Empir Finance 15(4): 613-634 
Daniel K, Grinblatt M, Titman S, Wermers R (1997) Measuring Mutual Fund 
Performance with Characteristic-Based Benchmarks. J Finance 52(3): 1035-
1058 
34 
 
Davis JL (2001) Mutual Fund Performance and Manager Style. Financ Anal J 57(1): 
19-27 
Dor AB, Jagannathan R, Meyer I (2003) Understanding mutual fund and hedge fund 
styles using return - based style analysis. J Invest Manage 1(1): 94-134 
Driscoll JC, Kraay AC (1998) Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimation with 
Spatially Dependent Panel Data. Rev Econ Stat 80: 549–560 
Eling M, (2008) Does the Measure Matter in the Mutual Fund Industry? Financ Anal J 
64(3): 1-13 
Elton EJ, Gruber MJ, Blake CR (1996) The persistence of risk-adjusted mutual fund 
performance. J Bus 69: 133-157 
Elton EJ, Gruber MJ, Blake CR (2001) A first look at the accuracy of the CRSP 
mutual fund database and a comparison of the CRSP and Morningstar mutual 
fund databases. J Finance 56: 2415-2450 
Elton EJ, Gruber MJ, Blake CR (2011) Holdings data, security returns, and the 
selection of superior mutual funds. J Financ Quant Anal 46(2): 341-367 
Fabozzi FJ, Francis JC (1977) Stability tests for alphas and betas over bull and bear 
market conditions.  J Finance 32(4): 1093-1099 
Fama EF, French KR (2010) Luck versus skill in the cross-section of mutual fund 
returns. J Finance 65(5): 1915-1947 
Ferruz L, Muñoz F, Vargas M (2010) Does the size of fund family matter when 
choosing investment strategy? Evidence from Spain. Quant Finance Acc 
35(3): 314-334 
Ferruz L, Vicente L, Andreu L (2009) Performance persistence and its influence on 
money and investor flows into Spanish pension plans. Rev  Quant Finance 
Acc 32(1): 85-100 
Ferson WE, Sarkissian S, Simin T (1999) The alpha factor asset pricing model: A 
parable. J Financ Markets 2(1): 49-68  
Financial Services Authority (FSA) (2008) Quality of advice on pension switching: A 
report on the findings of a thematic review. The Financial Services Authority, 
London. 
Gonzalez L, Powell JG, Shi J, Wilson A (2005) Two centuries of bull and bear market 
cycles. Inter Rev Econ Finance 14(4): 469-486 
Grinblatt M, Titman S (1993) Performance measurement without benchmarks: an 
examination of mutual fund returns. J Bus 66: 47-68 
35 
 
Henriksson RD (1984) Market Timing and Mutual Fund Performance: An Empirical 
Investigation. J Bus 57(1): 73-96 
Hibbert AM, Lawrence ER (2010) Testing the performance of asset pricing models in 
different economic and interest rate regimes using individual stock returns. 
ePublications@bond 
Hinz RP, Heinz R, Antolin P (2010) Evaluating the financial performance of pension 
funds. Washington, D.C., World Bank Publications 
Hoechle D (2007) Robust standard errors for panel regressions with cross-sectional 
dependence. Stata J 7(3): 281-312 
Huij J, Verbeek M (2009) On the use of multifactor models to evaluate mutual fund 
performance. Financ Manage 38 (1): 75-102 
Ingersoll J, Spiegel M, Goetzmann W, Welch I (2007) Portfolio Performance 
Manipulation and Manipulation-proof Performance Measures. Rev Financ 
Stud 20(5): 1503-1546 
Investment Company Institute (ICI) (2011) Characteristics of Mutual Fund Investors, 
2011.  October 2011, Vol 11(6); www.ici.org/pdf/per17-06.pdf   
Investment Company Institute (ICI) (2013) Investment Company Fact Book (2013) 
ed. 53rd; http://www.icifactbook.org/fb_ch2.html#us   
Ippolito RA, Turner JA (1987) Turnover, Fees and Pension Plan Performance. Financ 
Anal J 43(6): 16-26 
Jensen MC, Black F, Scholes MS (1972) The capital asset pricing model: Some 
empirical tests. Michael C. Jensen, Studies in the Theory of Capital Markets, 
Praeger Publishers Inc. 
Khotari SP, Warner JB (2001) Evaluation mutual fund performance. J Finance 56(5): 
1985-2010 
Klein A, Rosenfeld J (1987) The influence of market conditions on event-study 
residuals. J Financ Quant Anal 22(3): 345-351 
Kryzanowski L, Rahman  A (2008). Portfolio performance ambiguity and benchmark 
inefficiency revisited. J Asset Manage 9, 321–332. 
Lakonishok J, Shleifer A, Vishny RW, Hart O, Perry GL (1992) The Structure and 
Performance of the Money Management Industry. Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity. Microeconomics 1992: 339-391. 
Lo AW (2002) The Statistics of Sharpe Ratios. Financ Analysts Journal 58(4): 36-52 
36 
 
Maheu J M, McCurdy TH (2000) Identifying bull and bear markets in stock returns. J 
Bus Econ Stat 18(1): 100-112. 
Massa M (2003) How do family strategies affect fund performance? When 
performance-maximization is not the only game in town. J Financ Econ 67(2): 
249-304 
Modigliani F, Pogue GA (1974) An introduction to risk and return: Concepts and 
evidence. Financ Anal J 30(3): 69-86 
Modigliani F, Modigliani L (1997) Risk-adjusted performance. J Portfolio Manage 
23(2): 45-54 
Novy-Marx R, Bauh J (2011) Public pension promises: How big are they and what are 
they worth? J Finance 64(4): 1211-1249 
Owadally I (2014) Tail risk in pension funds: An analysis using ARCH models and 
bilinear processes. Rev Quant Finance Acc 43(2): 301-331 
Peizer, J., and A. White (2006) The relative merits of investible hedge fund indices 
and of funds of hedge funds in optimal passive portfolios, ICMA DP Series 
DP2006-10 
Phelps ES, Pollak RA (1968) On Second-Best National Saving and Game-
Equilibrium Growth. Rev Econ Stud 35(2): 185-199 
Rooij van M, Alessie R, Lusardi A (2011) Financial Literacy and Stock Market 
Participation. J Financ Econ 101(2): 449-472 
Roll R (1977) A critique of the asset pricing theory's tests Part I: On past and potential 
testability of the theory. J Financ Econ 4(2): 129-176 
Roll R, Ross SA (1994) On the Cross-Sectional Relation between Expected Returns 
and Betas. J Finance 49(1): 101-121 
Roy AD (1952) Safety First and the Holding of Assets. Econometrica 20(3): 431-449 
Sensoy BA (2009) Performance evaluation and self-designated benchmark indexes in 
the mutual fund industry. J Financ Econ 92(1): 25-39 
Sharpe WF (1966) Mutual Fund Performance. J Bus 39(1): 119-138 
Shukla R, Trzcinka C (1994) Persistant performance in the mutual fund market: Tests 
with funds and investment advisors. Rev Quant Finance Acc 4(2): 115-135  
Sortino FA, van der Meer R (1991) Downside risk. J Portfolio Manage 17(4): 27-31 
Thomas A, Tonks I (2001) Equity performance of segregated pension funds in the 
UK. J Asset Manage 1(4): 321-343 
37 
 
Wilcox RR (2005) Winsorized Robust Measures. Encyclopedia of Statistics in 
Behavioral Science  
Wood A, Young P, Crowther N, Toberman A (2012) Processes and costs of 
transferring a pension scheme: Qualitative research with pension providers 
and third-party administrators. Department for Work and Pensions, Working 
Paper 107 
Vaze P, Roker R (2011) Is it advisable?  An investigation into switching and advice in 
the individual personal pensions market. Consumer Focus  
 
38 
 
Table 1 Summary statistics  
 
Panel A: 
Initial sample  
Panel B:  
PPB-Unrestricted sample  
Panel C: 
PPB-Restricted sample 
 Panel D:  
PPB-Unrestricted sample 
1980-2007 
 Panel E: 
PPB-Restricted sample 
1980-2007 
Style Funds  Obs.  Funds  Obs.  Funds  Obs. 
 
Funds  Obs.  Funds  Obs. 
ALL of which 10,086  75,638  9,659  74,175  4,531  25,292 
 7,838  15,665  3,515  23,786 
  ALC 2,043  15,021  1,910  14,682  337  1,814 
 1,515  3,028  274  1,719 
  FI 1,427  10,844  1,357  10,649  630  3,586 
 1,125  2,250  480  3,367 
 Equity, of which  5,135  36,135  4,978  35,410  3,230  18,340 
 
4,047  8,085  2,554  17,322 
EM-E 259  1056  246  1,023  158  590 
 151  302  97  498 
I-E 2,864  21,451  2,768  21,010  1,708  10,061 
 2,253  4,500  1,333  9,494 
   UK-E 2,012  13,628  1,964  13,377  1,364  7,689 
 1,643  3,283  1,124  7,330 
Other 1,481  13,638  1,414  13,434  334  1,552 
 1,151  2,302  207  1,378 
            
 
       
ALL of which 100%  100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
 
100.0%  100.0%  100%  100% 
 ALC 20.3%  19.9%  19.8%  19.8%  7.4%  7.2% 
 
19.3%  19.3%  7.8%  7.2% 
 FI 14.1%  14.3%  14.0%  14.4%  13.9%  14.2% 
 
14.4%  14.4%  13.6%  14.2% 
 Equity, of which  50.9%  47.8%  51.5%  47.7%  71.3%  72.5% 
 
51.6%  51.6%  72.7%  72.8% 
EM-E 2.6%  1.4%  2.5%  1.4%  3.5%  2.3% 
 
1.9%  1.9%  2.8%  2.1% 
I-E 28.4%  28.4%  28.7%  28.3%  37.7%  39.8% 
 
28.7%  28.7%  38.0%  39.9% 
UK-E 19.9%  18.0%  20.3%  18.0%  30.1%  30.4% 
 
21.0%  21.0%  31.9%  30.8% 
 Other 14.7%  18.0%  14.6%  18.1%  7.4%  6.1% 
 
14.7%  14.7%  5.9%  5.8% 
The table shows the summery statistics for all funds (ALL) and in separation for individual investment styles (ALC-allocation; FI-fixed income; EM-E-emerging equity; I-E-international 
equity, UK-E - UK equity; Other-denotes all styles not included in the above styles). Panel A shows statistics for all funds downloaded from the Morningstar DirectTM . Panel B shows the 
statistics for all the funds for which information on returns for at least six months was available. Panel C shows the statistics for all the funds for which information on their PPB returns was 
available. Panels D and E are equivalent to Panels B and C, respectively, but include funds opened between 1980 and 2007 
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Table 2 Performance of pension funds based on the yearly returns (YRs, %) in 1980-2009 and 1980-2007 
 1980-2009  1980-2007 
 Panel A: PPB-restricted sample  Panel B: PPB- 
unrestricted sample 
 Panel C: PPB-restricted sample  Panel D: PPB-
unrestricted sample 
 R-PPB  M2  R-Tbill  Sharpe  R-Tbill  Sharpe  R-PPB  M2  R-Tbill  Sharpe  R-Tbill  Sharpe 
ALL 2.573***  2.970***  3.004  0.311  1.890  -0.234  2.613***  2.003***  4.092  0.337*  2.437  -0.257 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.499)  (0.217)  (0.554)  (0.750)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.132)  (0.081)  (0.275)  (0.648) 
Funds 4,531  4,531  4,531  4,531  9,659  9,659  3,305  3,305  3,305  3,305  7,405  7,405 
Obs. 25,292  25,292  25,292  25,292  74,175  74,175  16,756  16,756  16,756  16,756  55,376  55,376 
                        
ALC 2.950***  3.495***  1.952  0.358  1.586  0.631  2.505***  1.940***  2.794  0.363  2.258  0.767 
 (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.671)  (0.297)  (0.627)  (0.482)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.407)  (0.188)  (0.385)  (0.293) 
Funds 337  337  337  337  1,910  1,910  246  246  246  246  1,414  1,414 
Obs. 1,814  1,814  1,814  1,814  14,682  14,682  1,171  1,171  1,171  1,171  11,027  11,027 
                        
FI 3.135***  3.080***  1.317  0.095  1.049  0.119  3.446***  3.191***  -0.124  -0.071  0.128  -0.152 
 (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.434)  (0.695)  (0.469)  (0.868)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.890)  (0.735)  (0.889)  (0.822) 
Funds 630  630  630  630  1,357  1,357  456  456  456  456  1,076  1,076 
Obs. 3,586  3,586  3,586  3,586  10,649  10,649  2,407  2,407  2,407  2,407  7,982  7,982 
                        
EM-E 2.557***  5.180**  18.620*  1.087***  16.712**  2.604**  0.859  -0.360  19.29***  1.048***  17.043***  2.626*** 
 (0.001)  (0.049)  (0.054)  (0.003)  (0.050)  (0.019)  (0.122)  (0.454)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Funds 158  158  158  158  246  246  90  90  90  90  138  138 
Obs. 590  590  590  590  1,023  1,023  304  304  304  304  579  579 
                        
I-E 2.326***  2.700***  3.272  0.321  2.524  0.639  2.036***  1.311***  4.890  0.397**  3.427  0.831 
 (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.435)  (0.101)  (0.500)  (0.321)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.142)  (0.028)  (0.295)  (0.187) 
Funds 1,708  1,708  1,708  1,708  2,768  2,768  1,262  1,262  1,262  1,262  2,138  2,138 
Obs. 10,061  10,061  10,061  10,061  21,010  21,010  6,828  6,828  6,828  6,828  15,584  15,584 
                        
UK-E 2.727***  3.147***  2.620  0.417  2.452  1.006  3.376***  2.605***  4.828  0.564**  4.034  1.496* 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.677)  (0.259)  (0.649)  (0.380)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.154)  (0.047)  (0.218)  (0.098) 
Funds 1,364  1,364  1,364  1,364  1,964  1,964  1,051  1,051  1,051  1,051  1,547  1,5470 
Obs. 7,689  7,689  7,689  7,689  13,377  13,377  5,082  5,082  5,082  5,082  9,484  9,484 
                        
Other 1.662  2.136  2.430  -0.133  0.210  -4.276***  1.284***  1.592***  1.837  -0.524***  0.698  -4.676*** 
 (0.177)  (0.211)  (0.487)  (0.559)  (0.904)  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.220)  (0.000)  (0.512)  (0.000) 
Funds 334  334  334  334  1,414  1,414  200  200  200  200  1,092  1,092 
Obs. 1,552  1,552  1,552  1,552  13,434  13,434  964  964  964  964  10,720  10,720 
The table shows the estimated average performance of pension funds based on the PPB-restricted (Panels A and C) and PPB-unrestricted (Panels B and D) samples based on yearly 
returns (YRs, %) calculated over 1980-2009 (Panels A and B) and over 1980-2007 (Panels C and D) using the Hoechle method with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. Fund and year 
fixed-effects included (not reported). P-values are shown in parenthesis. ***: 1% significance; **: 5% significance and *: 10% significance 
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Table 3 Performance of pension funds based the yearly returns (YRs, %) in 2008-2009 
 Funds created in the 1980-2007 period  Funds created in the 2008-2009 period 
 Panel A: PPB-restricted sample  Panel B: PPB-unrestricted 
sample 
 Panel C: PPB-restricted sample  Panel D: PPB-unrestricted 
sample 
 R-PPB  M2  R-Tbill  Sharpe  R-Tbill  Sharpe  R-PPB  M2  R-Tbill  Sharpe  R-Tbill  Sharpe 
ALL 2.245*  4.653***  -1.420  0.127  -1.380  -0.589  3.201***  5.835***  12.717**  0.905***  9.443  2.314* 
 (0.088)  (0.003)  (0.908)  (0.829)  (0.898)  (0.779)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.044)  (0.004)  (0.216)  (0.088) 
Funds 3,515  3,515  3,515  3,515  7,838  7,838  1,015  1,015  1,015  1,015  1,820  1,820 
Obs. 7,030  7,030  7,030  7,030  15,665  15,665  1,506  1,506  1,506  1,506  2,637  2,637 
                        
ALC 3.412**  5.996***  -0.929  0.229  -1.885  -0.269  4.571**  8.254***  8.972  1.105**  7.082  2.925* 
 (0.011)  (0.000)  (0.933)  (0.747)  (0.859)  (0.913)  (0.019)  (0.002)  (0.176)  (0.016)  (0.257)  (0.059) 
Funds 274  274  274  274  1,515  1,515  63  63  63  63  394  394 
Obs. 548  548  548  548  3,028  3,028  95  95  95  95  559  559 
                        
FI 2.153  2.559  3.545  0.313  3.238  0.624  3.256  3.618*  7.487***  0.966***  8.768**  3.521*** 
 (0.500)  (0.259)  (0.320)  (0.381)  (0.416)  (0.620)  (0.124)  (0.084)  (0.006)  (0.000)  (0.033)  (0.003) 
Funds 480  480  480  480  1,125  1,125  150  150  150  150  232  232 
Obs. 960  960  960  960  2,250  2,250  219  219  219  219  334  334 
                        
EM-E 3.502***  9.684***  7.659  0.798  8.567  1.739  6.753***  15.07***  21.95***  1.881***  36.124**  4.402** 
 (0.003)  (0.009)  (0.769)  (0.418)  (0.731)  (0.594)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.017)  (0.017) 
Funds 97  97  97  97  151  151  61  61  61  61  95  95 
Obs. 194  194  194  194  302  302  92  92  92  92  132  132 
                        
I-E 2.783*  5.366***  -2.251  0.062  -1.725  -0.191  3.719***  6.577***  11.240**  0.691***  8.583  1.654 
 (0.072)  (0.008)  (0.848)  (0.897)  (0.881)  (0.909)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.046)  (0.005)  (0.255)  (0.127) 
Funds 1,333  1,333  1,333  1,333  2,253  2,253  374  374  374  374  515  515 
Obs. 2,666  2,666  2,666  2,666  4,500  4,500  567  567  567  567  769  769 
                        
UK-E 1.619***  4.569***  -3.675  0.042  -3.173  -0.487  -0.485  1.878***  11.700  0.773*  7.700  1.464 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.823)  (0.956)  (0.842)  (0.856)  (0.153)  (0.000)  (0.166)  (0.052)  (0.475)  (0.402) 
Funds 1,124  1,124  1,124  1,124  1,643  1,643  240  240  240  240  321  321 
Obs. 2,248  2,248  2,248  2,248  3,283  3,283  359  359  359  359  483  483 
                        
Other 0.256  1.237  -0.245  0.132  -3.306  -3.428  6.628**  8.571**  13.513**  1.177***  8.128  2.034* 
 (0.942)  (0.768)  (0.980)  (0.802)  (0.620)  (0.141)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.025)  (0.000)  (0.205)  (0.072) 
Funds 207  207  207  207  1151  1,151  127  127  127  127  263  263 
Obs. 414  414  414  414  2302  2,302  174  174  174  174  360  360 
The table shows the estimated average performance of pension funds based on PPB-restricted (Panels A and C) and the PPB-unrestricted (Panels B and D) samples based on  the 
yearly returns (YRs, %) over 2008-2009 using the Hoechle method with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. Fund and year fixed-effects included (not reported).  P-values are shown 
in parenthesis. ***: 1% significance; **: 5% significance and *: 10% significance 
Table 4 Performance of pension funds based on the annualised compounded returns (ACRs, %) in 1980-2009 and 1980-2007 
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 Panel A: 1980-2009  Panel B: 1980-2007 
 R-PPB  M2  R-Tbill  Sharpe  SharpeAdj  SortinoTB  SortinoPPB  R-PPB  M2  R-Tbill  Sharpe  SharpeAdj  SortinoTB  SortinoPPB 
ALL 2.146***  2.616***  2.174***  0.175***  0.149***  0.750***  0.135**  2.262***  1.946***  3.463***  0.221***  -0.010  0.512***  0.357*** 
 (0.310)  (0.265)  (0.727)  (0.049)  (0.046)  (0.212)  (0.065)  (0.230)  (0.185)  (0.736)  (0.065)  (0.026)  (0.103)  (0.046) 
Funds 4,531  4,531  4,531  4,531  4,531  4,531  4,441  3,305  3,305  3,305  3,305  3,305  3,305  3,272 
                            
ALC 3.154***  3.662***  1.757*  0.202**  0.188**  0.993**  0.311***  1.633***  1.569***  1.373*  0.114  -0.001  0.248*  0.254** 
 (0.240)  (0.457)  (0.858)  (0.084)  (0.081)  (0.381)  (0.052)  (0.440)  (0.387)  (0.698)  (0.092)  (0.033)  (0.136)  (0.101) 
Funds 337  337  337  337  337  337  325  246  246  246  246  246  246  239 
                            
FI 1.942***  2.657***  2.033***  0.273***  0.260***  1.069***  0.363***  2.464***  2.352***  -1.531***  -0.390***  0.029  -0.537***  0.689*** 
 (0.363)  (0.340)  (0.514)  (0.059)  (0.058)  (0.278)  (0.083)  (0.293)  (0.301)  (0.279)  (0.067)  (0.020)  (0.095)  (0.090) 
Funds 630  630  630  630  630  630  625  456  456  456  456  456  456  455 
                            
EM-E 1.622**  2.845***  10.812***  0.469***  0.396***  1.251**  0.063  -1.201  -2.881*  26.695***  1.456***  0.312***  3.364***  -0.270 
 (0.628)  (0.570)  (1.875)  (0.094)  (0.078)  (0.465)  (0.051)  (1.432)  (1.422)  (1.590)  (0.093)  (0.048)  (0.296)  (0.262) 
Funds 158  158  158  158  158  158  158  90  90  90  90  90  90  90 
                            
I-E 2.078***  2.585***  2.790***  0.167***  0.133***  0.543***  0.146***  2.023***  1.737***  4.476***  0.327***  0.002  0.701***  0.283*** 
 (0.363)  (0.290)  (0.842)  (0.051)  (0.046)  (0.157)  (0.049)  (0.263)  (0.199)  (0.675)  (0.053)  (0.024)  (0.100)  (0.041) 
Funds 1,708  1,708  1,708  1,708  1,708  1,708  1,708  1,262  1,262  1,262  1,262  1,262  1,262  1,262 
                            
UK-E 1.976***  2.249***  1.359  0.075  0.056  0.608**  0.074  2.841***  2.454***  3.343***  0.331***  -0.058  0.597***  0.404*** 
 (0.467)  (0.387)  (0.847)  (0.055)  (0.053)  (0.271)  (0.115)  (0.245)  (0.200)  (0.973)  (0.085)  (0.037)  (0.128)  (0.045) 
Funds 1,364  1,364  1,364  1,364  1,364  1,364  1,364  1,051  1,051  1,051  1,051  1,051  1,051  1,051 
                            
Other 2.811***  3.024***  3.036***  0.272***  0.244***  1.309***  -0.340  2.606***  2.303***  1.362  -0.045  -0.079*  0.321  0.202 
 (0.583)  (0.524)  (0.946)  (0.077)  (0.073)  (0.341)  (0.347)  (0.548)  (0.460)  (1.014)  (0.102)  (0.042)  (0.199)  (0.222) 
Funds 334  334  334  334  334  334  261  200  200  200  200  200  200  175 
 
The table shows the estimated average performance of pension funds for the PPB-restricted annualised compounded returns (ACRs, %) over 1980-2009 (Panel A) and over 1980-2007 (Panel 
B) with standard errors clustered by provider. P-values are shown in parenthesis. ***: 1% significance; **: 5% significance and *: 10% significance 
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Table 5 Performance of pension funds based on the annualised compounded returns (ACRs, %) in 2008-2009 
 Panel A: Funds created in the 1980-2007 period  Panel B: Funds created in the 2008-2009 period 
 R-PPB  M2  R-Tbill  Sharpe  SharpeAdj  SortinoTB  SortinoPPB  R-PPB  M2  R-Tbill  Sharpe  SharpeAdj  SortinoTB  SortinoPPB 
ALL 2.012***  2.177***  -5.004***  -0.194***  -0.025  -0.247***  0.107**  1.479  3.157***  11.254***  0.842***  0.756***  4.271***  -0.048 
 (0.277)  (0.262)  (0.222)  (0.011)  (0.023)  (0.021)  (0.047)  (1.321)  (1.084)  (2.524)  (0.176)  (0.162)  (1.150)  (0.254) 
Funds 3,515  3,515  3,516  3,516  3,516  3,516  3,470  1,015  1,015  1,015  1,015  1,015  1,015  957 
                             
ALC 3.170***  3.320***  -3.223***  -0.163***  -0.010  -0.229***  0.210*  3.786***  6.221***  9.888***  1.141***  1.099***  10.084**  0.492*** 
 (0.656)  (0.582)  (0.247)  (0.013)  (0.031)  (0.019)  (0.109)  (0.586)  (1.122)  (2.085)  (0.221)  (0.216)  (4.212)  (0.149) 
Funds 274  274  274  274  274  274  266  63  63  63  63  63  63  58 
                             
FI 1.808***  2.494***  2.207***  0.214***  0.026  0.538***  0.294***  1.546  3.146**  8.163***  1.047***  1.024***  5.386***  0.175 
 (0.443)  (0.375)  (0.371)  (0.027)  (0.019)  (0.060)  (0.084)  (1.151)  (1.261)  (1.850)  (0.234)  (0.234)  (1.778)  (0.280) 
Funds 480  480  480  480  480  480  478  150  150  150  150  150  150  146 
                             
EM-E 2.338***  2.722***  -4.262***  -0.091***  0.271***  -0.126***  0.118***  2.322  5.380***  16.954***  0.722***  0.594***  4.391  0.049 
 (0.494)  (0.625)  (0.735)  (0.024)  (0.058)  (0.037)  (0.024)  (1.481)  (0.952)  (4.533)  (0.239)  (0.198)  (3.128)  (0.113) 
Funds 97  97  97  97  97  97  97  61  61  61  61  61  61  61 
                             
I-E 2.266***  2.361***  -5.175***  -0.203***  -0.010  -0.309***  0.136***  2.010  3.784***  13.102***  0.772***  0.641***  2.474***  0.068 
 (0.127)  (0.142)  (0.151)  (0.005)  (0.023)  (0.008)  (0.011)  (1.559)  (1.305)  (3.161)  (0.196)  (0.166)  (0.654)  (0.210) 
Funds 1,333  1,333  1,334  1,334  1,334  1,334  1,333  374  374  374  374  374  374  374 
                             
UK-E 1.816***  1.832***  -8.819***  -0.382***  -0.081**  -0.554***  0.068  -1.464  0.299  10.440**  0.778***  0.699***  4.217**  -0.638 
 (0.462)  (0.449)  (0.215)  (0.010)  (0.032)  (0.013)  (0.083)  (2.753)  (2.178)  (3.909)  (0.247)  (0.239)  (1.467)  (0.596) 
Funds 1,124  1,124  1,124  1,124  1,124  1,124  1,124  240  240  240  240  240  240  240 
                             
Other 0.231  0.367  -2.607***  -0.145*  -0.085**  -0.078  -0.550**  3.850***  4.135***  8.944***  0.837***  0.794***  5.401**  0.313 
 (1.119)  (1.244)  (0.733)  (0.071)  (0.040)  (0.182)  (0.252)  (0.951)  (1.156)  (1.816)  (0.129)  (0.128)  (2.005)  (0.241) 
Funds 207  207  207  207  207  207  172  127  127  127  127  127  127  78 
 
The table shows the estimated average performance of pension funds based on the PPB-restricted annualised compounded returns (ACRs, %) created in the 1980-2007 period (Panel A) and in 
the 2008-2009 period (Panel B). The performance is measured over the 2008-2009 period. Standard errors clustered by provider. P-values are shown in parenthesis. ***: 1% significance; **: 5% 
significance and *: 10% significance 
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Table 6 Performance of pension funds based on the annualised arithmetic average of monthly returns (AARs, %) in 1980-2009 and 1980-2007 
 Panel A: 1980-2009  Panel B: 1980-2007 
 R-PPB  M2  R-Tbill  Sharpe  SharpeAdj  SortinoTB  SortinoPPB  R-PPB  M2  R-Tbill  Sharpe  SharpeAdj  SortinoTB  SortinoPPB 
ALL 5.520***  5.968***  4.124***  0.269***  0.202***  0.906***  1.435***  2.393***  2.005***  4.349***  0.284***  0.065**  0.618***  0.383*** 
 (0.756)  (0.850)  (0.726)  (0.049)  (0.043)  (0.215)  (0.381)  (0.236)  (0.183)  (0.765)  (0.066)  (0.024)  (0.105)  (0.045) 
Funds 4,531  4,531  4,531  4,531  4,31  4,531  4,441  3,305  3,305  3,305  3,305  3,305  3,305  3,272 
                            
ALC 3.362***  3.910***  2.771***  0.272***  0.227***  1.100***  1.701**  1.627***  1.556***  1.921**  0.163*  0.054  0.322**  0.269** 
 (0.681)  (0.930)  (0.854)  (0.084)  (0.077)  (0.381)  (0.756)  (0.437)  (0.381)  (0.705)  (0.092)  (0.032)  (0.136)  (0.102) 
Funds 337  337  337  337  337  337  325  246  246  246  246  246  246  239 
                            
FI 3.974***  4.487***  2.519***  0.319***  0.284***  1.154***  1.270***  2.463***  2.348***  -1.395***  -0.365***  0.070***  -0.496***  0.692*** 
 (0.493)  (0.530)  (0.525)  (0.060)  (0.050)  (0.280)  (0.187)  (0.296)  (0.303)  (0.282)  (0.067)  (0.022)  (0.096)  (0.091) 
Funds 630  630  630  630  630  630  625  456  456  456  456  456  456  455 
                            
EM-E 17.741***  19.044***  16.266***  0.643***  0.471***  1.538***  1.343***  -0.887  -2.784*  29.145***  1.576***  0.395***  3.619***  -0.216 
 (1.742)  (2.078)  (1.764)  (0.093)  (0.069)  (0.472)  (0.268)  (1.454)  (1.433)  (1.609)  (0.092)  (0.035)  (0.300)  (0.254) 
Funds 158  158  158  158  158  158  158  90  90  90  90  90  90  90 
                            
I-E 6.728***  7.231***  5.160***  0.276***  0.184***  0.725***  0.690***  2.220***  1.831***  5.636***  0.402***  0.092***  0.832***  0.313*** 
 (0.920)  (1.026)  (0.838)  (0.051)  (0.039)  (0.159)  (0.135)  (0.278)  (0.201)  (0.703)  (0.054)  (0.023)  (0.102)  (0.042) 
Funds 1,708  1,708  1,708  1,708  1,708  1,708  1,708  1,262  1,262  1,262  1,262  1,262  1,262  1,262 
                            
UK-E 3.737***  3.981***  2.167**  0.169***  0.134**  0.757***  0.657***  2.958***  2.514***  4.125***  0.394***  0.017  0.694***  0.424*** 
 (1.033)  (1.135)  (0.821)  (0.055)  (0.060)  (0.274)  (0.210)  (0.244)  (0.195)  (0.978)  (0.085)  (0.036)  (0.129)  (0.045) 
Funds 1,364  1,364  1,364  1,364  1,364  1,364  1,364  1,051  1,051  1,051  1,051  1,051  1,051  1,051 
                            
Other 5.934***  6.309***  5.469***  0.366***  0.273***  1.478***  10.491*  2.780***  2.352***  2.507**  0.018  -0.002  0.450**  0.307* 
 (0.741)  (0.884)  (1.093)  (0.081)  (0.065)  (0.347)  (5.648)  (0.589)  (0.480)  (1.065)  (0.103)  (0.047)  (0.204)  (0.172) 
Funds 334  334  334  334  334  334  261  200  200  200  200  200  200  175 
 
The table shows the estimated average performance of pension funds based on PPB-restricted annualised arithmetic average of monthly returns (AARs, %) over 1980-2009 (Panel A) and over 1980-2007 
(Panel B) with standard errors clustered by provider. P-values are shown in parenthesis. ***: 1% significance; **: 5% significance and *: 10% significance 
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Table 7 Performance of pension funds based on  the yearly log-returns (YLRs x100) calculated in 1980-2009 and 1980-2007  
 Panel A: 1980-2009  Panel B: 1980-2007 
 R-PPB  M2  R-Tbill  Sharpe  SharpeAdj  SortinoTB  SortinoPPB  R-PPB  M2  R-Tbill  Sharpe  SharpeAdj  SortinoTB  SortinoPPB 
ALL 2.200***  2.700***  0.500  0.614  0.689 2.883*  5.192***  2.200***  1.804***  2.200  0.737  -0.559  2.686**  5.346*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.904)  (0.454)  (0.852)  (0.051)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.411)  (0.240)  (0.849)  (0.016)  (0.000) 
Funds 4,531  4,531  4,531  4,531  4,531  4,531  4,531  3,305  3,305  3,305  3,305  3,305  3,305  3,305 
 25,292  25,292  25,292  25,292  25,292  25,292  25,292  16,756  16,756  16,756  16,756  16,756  16,756  16,756 
                            
ALC 2.700***  3.300***  0.400  0.936  1.715  3.022  6.048***  2.300***  1.810***  1.512  0.975  0.018***  0.015  0.975 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.930)  (0.395)  (0.721)  (0.123)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.660)  (0.298)  (0.000)  (0.660)  (0.298) 
Funds 337  337  337  337  337  337  337  246  246  246  246  246  246  246 
 1,814  1,814  1,814  1,814  1,814  1,814  1,814  1,171  1,171  1,171  1,171  1,171  1,171  1,171 
                            
FI 2.700***  2.900***  0.600  0.196  0.442  2.195 
 10.585**
*  3.100***  3.001***  -0.402  -0.268  -4.187  0.956  12.069*** 
 (0.007)  (0.000)  (0.682)  (0.800)  (0.909)  (0.114)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.680)  (0.695)  (0.239)  (0.429)  (0.000) 
Funds 630  630  630  630  630  630  630  456  456  456  456  456  456  456 
 3,586  3,586  3,586  3,586  3,586  3,586  3,586  2,407  2,407  2,407  2,407  2,407  2,407  2,407 
                            
EM-E 1.700***  4.200**  9.700  2.614**  17.814**  7.554***  2.536***  0.603  -0.302  13.70***  2.701***  11.598***  6.523***  1.501*** 
 (0.001)  (0.029)  (0.315)  (0.018)  (0.012)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.206)  (0.469)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Funds 158  158  158  158  158  158  158  90  90  90  90  90  90  90 
 590  590  590  590  590  590  590  304  304  304  304  304  304  304 
                            
I-E 1.900***  2.400***  0.600  0.691  1.488  2.511**  3.413***  1.600***  1.004***  2.300  0.920  1.071  2.924***  3.170*** 
 (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.886)  (0.284)  (0.589)  (0.030)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.490)  (0.120)  (0.725)  (0.006)  (0.000) 
Funds 1,708  1,708  1,708  1,708  1,708  1,688  1,688  1,262  1,262  1,262  1,262  1,262  1,262  1,262 
 10,061  10,061  10,061  10,061  10,061  9,821  9,821  6,828  6,828  6,828  6,828  6,828  6,828  6,828 
                            
UK-E 2.500***  3.100***  -0.300  0.968  -0.851  3.614*  5.586***  3.000***  2.300***  3.205  1.560*  1.177  3.646**  6.170*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.967)  (0.432)  (0.877)  (0.099)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.334)  (0.091)  (0.751)  (0.019)  (0.000) 
Funds 1,364  1,364  1,364  1,364  1,364  1,364  1,364  1,262  1,262  1,262  1,262  1,262  1,262  1,262 
 7,689  7,689  7,689  7,689  7,689  7,689  7,689  6,828  6,828  6,828  6,828  6,828  6,828  6,828 
                            
Other 1.300  1.300  0.400  -1.616**  -3.870  1.443  2.571***  0.900**  1.100**  0.401  -2.708***  -14.195***  -0.298  1.389*** 
 (0.221)  (0.396)  (0.887)  (0.034)  (0.226)  (0.221)  (0.000)  (0.034)  (0.015)  (0.792)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.659)  (0.000) 
Funds 334  334  334  334  334  334  334  200  200  200  200  200  200  200 
 1,552  1,552  1,552  1,552  1,552  1,552  1,552  964  964  964  964  964  964  964 
The table shows the estimated average performance of pension funds based on PPB-restricted yearly log-returns (YLRs x100) calculated over 1980-2009 (Panels A and B) and over 1980-
2007 (Panels C and D) using the Hoechle  method with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. Fund and year fixed-effects included (not reported). P-values are shown in parenthesis. ***: 1% 
significance; **: 5% significance and *: 10% significance. 
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Table 8 Annualised nominal and risk adjusted performance of portfolios consisting  the FTSE All Share Index and  the MSCI indices  
  2000-2009  2005-2009  2008-2009 
MSCI index  P-FTSE  M2  P-FTSE  M2  P-FTSE  M2 
Emerging markets  1.891  2.153  2.730  2.610  1.731  2.417 
             
EM Latin America  3.138  3.417  4.395  4.089  3.709  4.247 
Brazil  3.755  4.117  5.643  5.044  3.678  4.446 
             
Pacific except Japan  3.181  3.460  4.533  4.200  3.461  4.037 
EM Asia  1.523  1.788  2.557  2.455  1.631  2.341 
China  3.576  3.705  4.236  3.925  1.961  2.742 
India  3.172  3.429  4.176  3.741  0.902  2.260 
The table shows the annualised nominal and risk adjusted performance statistics for the portfolios (P) consisting of 80% of the FTSE All Share Index and 20% of one of the MSCI 
indices listed in the left column, in comparison with the returns of the FTSE All Share index (FTSE) over three time periods using the annualised compounded returns, % 
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Table 9 Performance of PPBs 
 Panel A: YRs  Panel B: ACRs 
 1980-2009  1980-2007  2008-2009  1980-2009  1980-2007  2008-2009 
 PPB-Tbill  Sharpe  PPB--Tbill  Sharpe  PPB--Tbill  Sharpe  PPB-Tbill  Sharpe  PPB--Tbill  Sharpe  PPB--Tbill  Sharpe 
ALL 0.587  0.140  1.122  0.140  -0.703  0.142  0.550  0.050  1.154***  0.020  -2.547***  -0.017 
 (0.863)  (0.442)  (0.668)  (0.425)  (0.939)  (0.708)  (0.495)  (0.307)  (0.010)  (0.612)  (0.009)  (0.761) 
Funds 2,068  2,068  1,527  1,527  2,068  2,068  2,068  2,068  1,527  1,527  2,068  2,068 
Obs. 13,253  13243  9,370  9,360  3,883  3,883             
                        
ALC -0.624  0.214  0.696  0.242  -3.195  0.203  -0.966  0.088  0.163  0.141  -4.157***  -0.036 
 (0.874)  (0.426)  (0.824)  (0.311)  (0.729)  (0.694)  (0.284)  (0.419)  (0.702)  (0.126)  (0.001)  (0.764) 
Funds 204  204  151  151  204  204  204  204  151  151  204  204 
Obs. 1,135  1,135  750  750  385  385             
                        
FI -1.633*  -0.400**  -3.354***  -0.648***  2.348***  0.166**  0.206  -0.074  -3.712***  -0.796***  2.166***  0.152*** 
 (0.093)  (0.040)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.024)  (0.727)  (0.254)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.008) 
Funds 384  384  286  286  384  384  384  384  286  286  384  384 
Obs. 2,382  2,381  1,663  1,662  719  719             
                        
EM-E 15.403  0.841***  17.021***  0.973***  13.414  0.681  10.077***  0.402***  15.254***  1.579***  2.424  0.172 
 (0.113)  (0.009)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.557)  (0.363)  (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.456)  (0.274) 
Funds 81  81  44  44  81  81  81  81  44  44  81  81 
Obs. 321  321  177  177  144  144             
                        
I-E 0.914  0.173  2.315  0.259  -2.618  -0.043  0.698  0.024  2.453***  0.187***  -3.749***  -0.124** 
 (0.810)  (0.355)  (0.484)  (0.164)  (0.790)  (0.909)  (0.506)  (0.653)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.045) 
Funds 882  882  662  662  882  882  882  882  662  662  882  882 
Obs. 5,873  5,864  4,205  4,196  1,668  1,668             
                        
UK-E 0.415  0.223  1.771  0.300  -2.001  -0.022  -1.207  -0.050  1.223*  0.068  -7.292***  -0.265*** 
 (0.938)  (0.477)  (0.727)  (0.255)  (0.909)  (0.977)  (0.198)  (0.245)  (0.071)  (0.279)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Funds 303  303  250  250  303  303  303  303  250  250  303  303 
Obs. 2,451  2,451  1,867  1,867  584  584             
                        
Other 0.961  0.670***  0.894  0.547***  1.086  0.888***  0.874  0.353***  0.068  0.204**  0.290  0.419*** 
 (0.681)  (0.000)  (0.619)  (0.000)  (0.851)  (0.000)  (0.339)  (0.000)  (0.937)  (0.012)  (0.770)  (0.000) 
Funds 214  214  134  134  214  214  214  214  134  134  214  214 
Obs. 1,091  1,091  708  708  383  383             
The table shows the estimated average performance of PPBs under the restriction that if several funds were incepted with the same PPB at the same calendar month that PPB enters 
the regressions only once.  YRs denotes yearly returns and ACRs denotes annualised compounded returns. P-values are shown in parenthesis. ***: 1% significance; **: 5% 
significance and *: 10% significance 
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Fig.1 Number of funds opened in the period 1980-2009 per investment style (with EM-E, I-E 
and UK-E combined into Equity). The statistics for the period of 1980-1999 are presented 
on a five-year basis. The 2000-2009 statistics are annual 
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Fig.2 Expansion of a frontier when additional assets are included. The dotted line denotes 
the frontier when additional asset are added to the ‘basic’ frontier. PPB and M denote 
market portfolios determined by the frontiers and the risk free rate. P denotes the efficient 
portfolio on the extended frontier that has the same risk as PPB 
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Fig. 3 Average risk-return characteristics of funds (denoted by F_ and the 
abbreviation of the investment style name; diamond shapes) and their PPBs (denoted 
by B_ and the abbreviation of the investment style name; circle shapes) based on 
annualised compounded returns, ACRs. Investment styles: ALC – allocation, FI – 
fixed income, EM-E – emerging markets equity, I-E – international equity, UK-E – 
UK equity, and Other – all other styles. Panel a shows risk/return characteristics in 
1980-2009; panel b shows risk/return characteristics in 1980-2007; panel c shows 
risk/return characteristics in 2008-2009 of the funds created in 1980-2007; panel d 
shows risk/return characteristics of the funds created in 2008-2009 
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Appendix 1. Classification of ABI sectors into investment style categories. 
 
Allocation 
   Equity    
Fixed Income 
 
Other  
Equity UK  Emerging markets  
International 
markets 
  
Balanced (up to 
85% Equity) 
Managed 
Cautious (up to 
60% Equity) 
Managed 
Defensive (up 
to 35% Equity) 
Managed 
Flexible (up to 
100% Equity) 
Managed 
 UK All Companies 
UK Smaller 
Companies  
UK Equity Income 
 Global Emerging 
Markets Equities 
 Asia Pacific excl. Japan 
Asia Pacific incl. Japan 
Europe excl. UK 
Europe incl. UK 
Global Equities 
Japan Equities 
North America 
 Global Fixed Interest 
Global High Yield 
Sterling Corporate Bond 
Sterling Fixed Interest 
Sterling High Yield 
Sterling Long Bond 
Sterling Other Fixed 
Interest 
UK Index-Linked Gilts 
UK Gilt 
 Commodity/Energy 
Money Market 
Protected/Guaranteed 
Funds 
Global Property 
UK Direct Property 
Specialist 
 
 
 
 
